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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE B. FREEMAN, 
Plaintiff and .Appellant, 
-vs.-
ADIEL F. STEWART, LAMONT B. 
GUNDERSEN, andRAYP. GREEN-
WOOD, As Commissioners of Salt Case No. 8183 
Lake County and as Directors of the 
Salt Lake City Suburban Sewer Dis-
trict; and E. R. CALLISTER, JR., 
Attorney General, State of Utah. 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
This action was brought in the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County under the Declaratory J udg-
ments Act. Plaintiff asked for a declaration of his con-
stitutional rights as a taxpayer which he claims are in 
grave jeopardy by proceedings of the Salt Lake County 
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Commissioners in creating, managing and operating the 
Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary District. Plaintiff 
claims that his right to vote for local officers who have 
the power to levy taxes for local corporate functions, is 
denied, and that tlie constitutional provisions protecting I ' 
him from excessive debt and tax burdens are circum-
vented and ignored. From the District Courts' ruling that 
"plaintiffs' complaint be dismissed with prejudice, no 
cause of action," plaintiff has appealed. 
The parties are agreed as to the need for a sewer 
in the area. It seems foolish, however, for 9,000 families 
to build a colossal project for 45,000 families at the pres-
ent high costs. It is also very necessary that sewer lines 
be kept reasonably flushed. Large lines which are not 
adequately used become obstructed and when full capa-
city is required, often need replacement; this has hap-
pened in other states. 
An adequate sewer can be built within the limits of 
the Constitution; the need for a sewer should not be used I 1 
as an excuse for breaking the law and ignoring consti-
tutional provisions which guard individual freedom and 
liberty. County Commissioners, who head a civil division 
of the State, should not be permitted to usurp the cor-
porate powers of local self-government by appointing 
themselves the corporate officers of a local public cor-
poration without the vote of the people in the local area, 
to tax without limit in that area, and to exceed estab-
lished debt limits. 
If this sort of despotism is condoned by the courts, 
then the Constitution which the courts have sworn to 
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tO 
guard, is gone, and the courts have nothing left to guard 
save the good will and approval of politicians and a legis-
lative assembly-a legislative assembly which cannot dis-
franchise or deprive any one of the rights or privileges 
of a citizen, unless a statute is passed for that purpose; 
an assembly which can do no wrong unless it chooses to 
do it. If legislation which emasculates and tears the Con-
stitution to shreds is "implemented" by the courts, then 
the police power of government will have again suc-
ceeded in usurping the private corporate powers of local 
self-government of the people; liberty, freedom and dig-
nity will have again fallen by the blindness, the ignorance 
and the mental lethargy of man; and our course of 
"progress" will have turned toward ruin. This is a fact 
of history. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Apparently there is no dispute between the parties 
as to questions of fact. The Salt Lake City Suburban 
Sanitary District was originally created on September 9, 
1946 by resolution and order of the Salt Lake County 
Commission under authority of Chapter 14, Laws of 
Utah, 1933 (Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.A. 1953.) The his-
tory of the pertinent steps taken since that time which 
are necessary for a determination of the issues in this 
appeal are recited in the November 18, 1953 Bond Reso-
lution (Exhibit E of the Record) pages 1 to 9. 
The Salt Lake County Commissioners have appoint-
ed themselves Trustees of the Sewer District and have 
made covenants with the future purchasers of the revenue 
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bonds. The District has provided for a $2,410,000.00 
General bond issue and a $6,480,000.00 revenue bond 
issue and has provided for the payment of said bonds. 
The Salt Lake County Commissioners have effectu-
ated the transfer of the financing and operation of the 
district from the said 1933 Act to Chapter 29, Laws of 
Utah 1953. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. A DEBT IS CREATED ON THE PROPERTY 
IN THE DISTRICT WHICH EXCEEDS THE LIMITATIONS 
OF SEC. 17-6-3.5 .CHAPTER 29, LAWS OF UTAH 1953 AND 
ARTICLE XIV SECTION 4, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
POINT 2. TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION 
IS PERMITTED BY DELEGATING TO OTHER THAN THE 
"CORPORATE AUTHORITIES" OF A SEPARATE AND DIS-
TINCT ARM OF THE GOVERNMENT THE POWER TO TAX 
IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XIII SECTION 5, CONSTI-
TUTION OF UTAH. 
POINT 3. POLITICAL POWER OF THE STATE 
USURPS THE CORPORATE POWERS OF LOCAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS IN THAT: 
A. COUNTIES ARE PERMITTED TO PERFORM LOCAL 
CORPORATE FUNCTIONS WHICH ARE NOT UNIFORM 
THROUGHOUT THE CLASS - ARTICLE XI SECTION 4. 
B. THE SEWER DISTRICT IS A MUNI·CIPAL CORPO-
RATION WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF ART. VI SEC. 26, ART. 
XI SEC. 5, ART. XIII SEC. 5 AND ART. XIV SEC. 4. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. A DEBT IS CREATED ON THE PROPERTY 
IN THE DISTRICT WHICH EXCEEDS THE LIMITATIONS 
OF SEC. 17-6-3.5 ·CHAPTER 29, LAWS OF UTAH 1953 AND 
ARTICLE XIV SECTION 4 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
The proposed financing plan of the Salt Lake City 
Suburban Sanitary District is illegal, void and unconsti-
tutional, and is in violation of a writ of prohibition issued 
by this Court. The revenue bonds are to be paid by a 
service charge which becomes a lien upon property if 
delinquent, and they are also to be paid by a 4 mill ad 
valorem tax, and additional taxes can be levied if there 
is a deficiency in the revenues. The revenue bond issue 
is an obligation upon property in the district and creates 
a debt which exceeds statutory and constitutional debt 
limits. 
Sec. 17-6-3.5, Chapter 29 Laws of Utah 1953, pro-
vides a 12o/a debt limit for all bonds other than those 
payable solely from revenues. The general bond issue of 
$2,410,000.00 is approximately 12o/a of the assessed $22,-
568,000.00 (Ex. H) value of the district. This sec. pro-
vides: 
"The bonds * * * shall never be issued to an 
amount which, together with all other existing in-
debtedness of the district then outstanding, will 
exceed in principal amount twelve (12) per cent of 
the assessed value of the taxable property in the 
district * * *. Bonds issued * * * payable solely 
from revenues * * * shall not be included as bond-
ed indebtedness of the district for the purposes of 
such computation." 
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A four mill ad valorem tax is used in conjunction 
with the monthly service charges to pay the $6,480,000.00 
revenue bonds, therefore, these bonds are not payable 
solely from revenues. That a four mill tax is used to help 
pay the revenue bonds cannot be denied. Sec. 12, para. 
2, Nov. 18, 1953 bond resolution (Ex. E), p. 40, provides: 
"The board will fix and collect rates and 
charges for all services supplied by the system 
fully sufficient, after making allowance for delin-
quencies in collection, to provide (in conjunction 
with the proceeds of the annual operation and 
maintenance tax of four ( 4) mills which is to be 
caused to be levied by the board) for the pay-
ment of the expenses of maintaining and operating 
the system and to preserve it in good repair and 
working order, to produce an amount in each fis-
cal year equal to 1.35 times the amount of interest 
on the revenue bonds falling due on June 1 of 
such fiscal year and principal and interest falling 
due on December 1 of the next succeeding fiscal 
year and in addition a sufficient amount to make 
all other payments required to be made into the 
various funds created in this resolution." 
In analyzing the construction of the above sentence, 
it can be seen that the prepositional phrases "to pre-
serve," "to produce" and "to make" are in series. The 
board agrees to fix and collect rates and charges fully 
sufficient to provide (in conjunction with the proceeds 
of a 4 mill tax) for the payment of expenses, payment 
of interest and principal on the bonds when due, and all 
other payments required to be made into the various 
funds. 
There is also the additional fact that the various 
funds referred to (Sec. 11 of Ex. E) are to insure that 
6 
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sufficient money is available to make prompt payment 
on the revenue bonds. If the Operation and Maintenance 
Fund (Ex. E., p. 35 (a) ) were not "sweetened" by an 
ad valorem tax, revenues would have to be used in its 
place and there would be less money available for the 
Revenue Bond and Interest Redemption Fund (Ex. E., 
p. 36 (b) ) . Using the 4 mill tax in the manner provided 
is like adding ingredients to a measuring cup; what dif-
ference does it make whether the added ingredient is 
placed at the bottom or top of the existing ingredient 1 
Is not the required amount used to make the cake 1 If 
there are not sufficient revenues in the Revenue Bond 
and Interest Redemption Fund, the proceeds of an ad 
valorem tax is added in the Operation and Maintenance 
Fund to bring the revenues up to the required level. 
Thus it can be plainly seen that the 4 mill tax sup-
ports, guarantees and is used for payment of the revenue 
bonds in exactly the same manner and to the same extent 
as the monthly service charge revenues. They are used 
in conjunction with each other; therefore, the revenue 
bonds are not payable solely from revenues but are pay-
able primarily from revenues. 
Authority is granted the district to levy taxes with-
out regard to limitation or amount to pay both general 
obligation bonds and revenue bonds payable primarily 
from revenues. The said Nov. 18, 1953 bond resolution 
(Ex. E) ) at p. 18, provides : 
~~ "Each bond shall contain the recital of regu-
larity authorized by sec. 17-6-3.7 U.C.A .... " 
Section 17-6-3.7 U.C.A. (Chapter 29, Laws of Utah, 
1953), provides : 
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"Such recital shall conclusively import full 
compliance with all of the provisions of this chap-
ter, and all bonds issued containing such recital 
shall be incontestable for any cause whatsoever 
after their delivery for value." 
Sec. 17-6-3.5 of said chapter provides: 
". . . regardless of any limitations contained 
elsewhere in the laws of Utah and this act, in-
cluding 17-6-3.8 of this act, it shall be the duty of 
the board of trustees to cause to be levied annually 
on all taxable property in the district taxes fully. 
sufficient to pay principal of and interest on 
such bonds as principal and interest fall due, or if 
the bonds are payable primarily from revenues, 
then to anticilpate a;nd make u.p any amownts which 
may be necessary to pay such principal and inter-
est by reason of deficiencies in such re:vewues." 
(Italics added.) 
The entire $8,890,000.00 bond issue is a general obli-
gation against property. There is the additional fact 
that monthly service charges are subject to a lien on the 
property "on a parity with and collectible at the same 
time and in the same manner as general county taxes 
are a lien on such premises and are collectible." Sec. 
17-6-3.6, Ch. 29, L. 53. 
Sec. 12, para. 5, Nov. 18 resolution (Ex. E), p. 44, 
provides: 
"Any charge for services rendered by the sys~ 
tern which is not paid within ninety (90) days 
from the date on which it becomes due, shall be 
certified by the Clerk of the district to the Treas-
urer or Assessor of Salt Lake County and in each 
such case such delinquent charges, together with 
interest and penalties, shall immediately upon 
such certification become a lien on the delinquent 
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premises on a parity with and collectible at the 
same time and in the same manner as general 
county taxes, all as provided in Section 17-6-3.6, 
U.C.A. 1953. It shall be the duty of the proper of-
ficials of Salt Lake County to utilize promptly all 
methods of enforcing such lien available for col-
lection of general county taxes, including sale of 
the delinquent premises." 
It cannot be denied that the revenues are effective 
liens upon property and may be a means of divesting 
a taxpayer of his property, and, therefore, the revenue 
bonds are a debt within the meaning of the law. In the 
writ of prohibition issued by this Court in Bigler et al. 
v. Greenwood et al., ______ Utah ------, 254 Pac. 2d 843. At p. 
84 7, this Court said : 
"The plan followed was obviously designed 
for the purpose a;nd actually had the effect of 
imposing liens on the property within the distric·t. 
If such a scheme could be followed and yet remain 
classified as purely voluntary 'revenue bond' fi-
nancing program, then the constitutional guaran-
tees of due process of law and debt lirmits could 
be circumvented while effectively creating charges 
upon property. The district should not be per-
mitted to accomplish by artifice, subterfuge or in-
direction what the law will not permit it to do 
openly and directly." (Italics added.) 
The district has violated said writ on a second count 
in that the proposition to include the four mill tax used 
to help pay the revenue bonds was not advertised and 
was not voted upon at the Sept. 15, 1953 bond election. 
Therefore, it lacks due process. Proposition No. 2 (Ex. 
E, p. 8) in part provided: 
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"* * * which bonds shall constitute special 
obligations of said district payable solely from 
the operating revenue to be derived by said dis-
trict from the operation of its sanitary sewer sys-
tem lying within its boundaries." 
Because the service charges and the 4 mill ad valor-
em tax used to pay the revenue bonds and operation and 
maintenance may be a means of divesting the taxpayer 
of his property, the revenue bond financing program does 
not come within the purview of the special fund doctrine. 
The special fund doctrine was born in Barnes v. Lehi 
City, 75 Utah 321, 279 Pac. 878 and has been reaffirmed 
time and time again. At p. 338 of 7 4 Utah, this Court 
quoted a Colorado case, Shields v. City of Loveland', 7 4 
Colo. 27, 218 Pac. 913, as follows: 
"'Its meaning (debt) in the sections of the 
Constitution and statutes now before us must be 
determined by their purpose, which was to prevent 
the overburdening of the public * * *. Clearly the 
revenue bonds are not within that purpose. The 
public can not be overburdened by that which it 
is under no obligation to discharge, nor can the 
city become bankrupt by that which it does not. 
have to pay.'" 
And further at p. 340, this Court said : 
"The restrictions placed upon municipal cor-
porations by the debt limit provisions of the Con-
stitution must be upheld. The purpose of such 
provisions is 'to serve as a limit to taxation and a 
protection to taxpayers.' McQuillin, Mun. Corps. 
(2d Ed) No. 2364." 
The special fund doctrine has foundation in good 
sense, provided the revenue bonds are kept entirely be-
10 
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yond the police power of the state to divest one of his 
property if payments are not made. Revenue bond fi-
nancing includes the costs of operation and maintenance. 
If ad valorem taxes can be used to "relieve the burden of 
revenues" in order that the bonds can be more surely 
paid, the program has been held to create a debt within 
the purview of the Constitution. 
In the book, Fimancing Through Revenue Bonds, 
published by the National Institute of Municipal Law 
Officers, revenue bonds are defined as follows: 
"The term 'revenue bonds' is widely used, and 
has a reasonably definite meaning. It is generally 
understood to mean bonds which are payable out 
of the revenues of a publicly-owned and self-
liquidating utility, and which are purchased and 
dealt in exclusively or primarily in reliance upon 
the adequacy of such revenues to meet the service 
charges upon the bonds, irn additi,on to paying 
the costs of operation and maintenance of such 
utility and all other charges upon such revenues." 
(Underlining added.) 
This Court in the Barnes case, further said: 
"The credit of the city is not extended, nor 
is any money which is derived from taxation or 
other existing sources of revenue expended in the 
purchase price or maintenance cost of the plant 
The city cannot be coerced into applying any 
part of its general revenue for the payment of the 
purchase price of the plant or for any part of 
the cost of maintenance thereof." (Italics added.) 
In the case of Reiner v. Town of Holyoke, 27 Pac. 
2d 1032 (Colo.) the city pledged income from a water 
system to meet deferred payments on the plant, but pro-
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vided no special fund for freight, insurance, etc. in con-
nection with the plant. The court held this created a debt 
which could only be paid out of a tax levy and therefore 
unconstitutional. 
In the instant case the Board of Commissioners have 
covenanted to "levy and collect in each fiscal year an ad 
valorem tax levied on all taxable property in the district 
at such rate not greater than four ( 4) mills on the dollar 
as will be fully sufficient, in conjunction with any sur-
plus * * * of Section 11 (e) * * * to pay all reasonably 
necessary costs of maintaining and operating the, system 
in such fiscal year." 
Sec. 11 (a) of the Nov. 18, 1953 resolution, p. 35, 
provides: 
"Out of the revenues other than the initial 
payments there shall be first set aside * * * such 
amount, if any, as may be necessary to provide for 
the payment of such part of the expenses of main-
taining and operating the system in such fiscal 
year as may be in excess of the proceeds derived 
in such fiscal year from the levy of the four ( 4) 
mills operation and maintenance tax* * *." 
If the charges used directly or indirectly for the pay-
ment of revenue bonds can be a means of divesting a 
taxpayer of his property, then the bonds are an effective 
mortgage upon property and come within constitutional 
limitations. In the special fund theory, the payments of 
revenue bonds are subject to risk the same as any busi-
ness enterprise operating in a free market. If that risk 
is circumvented and a sure payment is guaranteed "in 
the same manner and to the same extent as taxes are a 
12 
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lien," then the special fund financing program has be-
come a debt as sure as death and taxes. 
This Court consistently has frowned on plans and 
schemes to circumvent the special fund philosophy, as is 
reflected in the decisions and language in State v. Cand-
land, 36 Utah 406, 104 Pac. 285; Barnes v. Lehi C~ty, 
Supra; Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 Pac. 2d 
144; Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 Pac. 
2d 161; Uta.h Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, 94 Utah 
203, 74 Pac. 2d 1191; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Ogden 
City, 95 Utah 161, 79 Pac. 2d 61; and Spence v. U.S.A.C., 
------ Utah ______ , 225 Pac. 2d 18. 
In .State v. Candland, this Court said at p. 427 of 36 
Utah: 
"If the amount necessary to pay principal and 
interest were in fact taken from income of the uni-
versity, it would simply result in requiring the 
state to supply the amount so taken from its gen-
eral fund for 'general maintenance,' and hence 
nothing would be gained, so far as the taxpayer 
is concerned * * * ." 
In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, this court 
said at p. 1208 of 7 4 Pac. 2d: 
"And since the city is, by the Constitution, 
prohibited from incurring debts beyond the speci-
fied limit, they cannot by subterfuge or indirection 
do that which they could not do openly and direct-
ly. The debt inhibition was written into the Con-
stitution to protect the citizens from, and assure 
them that there would be no excessive tax burden 
imposed upon them. This because the duty of, 
and necessity for, payment of tax is not optional 
or contractual, but a burden imposed not with 
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the consent, but often against the will, of the tax-
payer. There is the further reason that a tax 
becomes a lien upon the property of the taxpayer 
and may be a means of divestilng him of his prop-
erty. By its express terms the Constitution makes 
the limitations and inhibitions on the taxing power 
mandatory and prohibitory. Article 1, S. 26." 
(Italics added.) 
In the instant case the service charges are on a pari-
ty with taxes and can be a means of divesting the tax-
payer of his property. The district is trying to do by 
subterfuge what it cannot do openly; that is, guarantee 
the revenue bonds by charges upon prop€rty. In addition 
to this provision, an ad valorem tax up to 4 mills is used 
in the same manner and to the same extent and in con-
junction with the service charges to pay the revenue 
bonds and operation and maintenance and an additional 
tax can be levied if needed. The general obligation bond 
issue of $2,410,000.00 and the revenue bond issue of $6,-
480,000.00 makes a total debt of $8,890,000.00 which is 
approximately 40% of the assessed valuation. This is 
in excess of the 12% debt limit of Sec. 17-6-3.5, Ch. 29, 
L. 53, Supra. 
Section 4 of Article XIV, Const. of Utah, prohibits 
involuntary corporate entities such as counties from ex-
ceeding a 2% debt limit for its proprietary functions and 
voluntary corporate entities from exceeding a maximum 
12% debt limit for its proprietary functions. The corpo-
rate nature of the sewer district and its application to 
this Article is argued in Point 3, hereinafter. 
In Condor v. Univ. of Utah, ------ Utah ------, 257 Pac. 
2d 367, this Court chose to apply a "limited special fund" 
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theory to the State University. If this theory is extended 
to include a local, corporate function of a community as 
in the instant case, then the taxpayers right to consti-
tutional protection from burdensome and ruinous taxa-
tion is completely gone, and this part of the Constitution 
has been turned into mere nonsense. This Court said in 
State v. Carndland, Supra, at p. 429 of 36 Utah: 
"If the debt limit may be exceeded in the 
manner provided * * * then there is practically no 
limitation in this state." 
Appellant has asked for a declaration of his consti-
tutional right to debt limit protection. If he does not 
possess such rights, then let us face the truth that the 
clock is being turned back toward the despotism of the 
rulers of the serfs. 
POINT 2. TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION 
IS PERMITTED BY DELEGATING TO OTHER THAN THE 
"CORPORATE AUTHORITIES" OF A SEPARATE AND DIS-
TINCT ARM OF THE GOVERNMENT THE POWER TO TAX 
IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XIII SECTION 5, CONSTI-
TUTION OF UTAH. 
"The power of taxation is, of all the powers of 
government, the one most liable to abuse, even when 
exercised by the direct representatives of the people, and 
if committed to persons who may exercise it over others 
without reference to their consent, the certainty of its 
abuse would be simply a question of time." So said the 
Supreme Court of Illinois in Harward v. St. Clair Drain. 
Co., 51 Ill.130 at p. 135. 
In State v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 Pac. 337, this 
Court said at p. 483 of 27 Utah: 
IS 
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"The idea which permeates our whole system 
is that local authority shall manage and control 
local affairs. These are inalienable rights of the 
people, guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
United States, and can not be taken away. 'LocaJ. 
self-government,' says Judge Cooley, "having al-
ways been a part of the English and American 
systems, we shall look for its recognition in any 
such instrument. And, even if not expressly recog-
nized, it is still to be understood that all these 
instruments are framed with its present existence 
and anticipated continuance in view.' Cooley, 
Const. Lin. 4 7. See, also, Page 223, I d. The Con-
stitution of this State, the same as of every other 
State, was framed with local self-government in 
view. History shows that the territory which is 
comprised within the boundaries of this State 
constituted, under the territorial form of govern-
ment, a system of subdivisions, having been 
divided into counties, precincts, and other dis-
tricts and municipalities. Each of these subdi-
visions had, under the general laws of the terri-
tory, a system of local self-government, whereby 
LOCAL AFFAIRS WERE CONTROLLED BY 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES ELECTED BY THE 
PEOPLE OF THE SUBDIVISION. THIS WAS 
SO AS TO TAXATION, AS WELL AS TO 
OTHER SUBJ'ECTS." (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant sewer case, the Salt Lake County 
Commissioners have, by resolution, appointed themselves 
the Board of Trustees of the sewer district subdivision 
and two of the present county commissioners do not live 
within the district. There has been no election of the 
"corporate authorities," and, in addition, "agents" of the 
revenue bondholders are granted some of the power to 
manage and control the district. 
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This Court continues to say at p. 483 of 27 Utah: 
"When the Constitution was framed, the 
same system of subdivisions and local government 
was adopted, with, in some instances, closer adher-
ence to local government, as where** *the Legis-
lature is forbidden to 'impose taxes for the pur-
pose of any county, city, town or other municipal 
corporation, but may be law, vest in the corporate 
authorities thereof, respectively, the power to 
assess and collect taxes for all purpose of such 
corporation.' Article 13, Sec. 5." 
The officers of the sewer district can and intend to 
levy taxes. Sec. 9, p. 32 of the November 18, 1953 
bond resolution (Ex. E), provides: 
"Acting pursuant to the provisions of Section, 
17-6-3.5, U.C.A. 1953, the board covenants and 
agrees that it will cause to be levied annually 
against all taxable property in the district begin-
ning with the year 1954, taxes fully sufficient to 
pay principal of and interest on the general obli-
gation bonds as such principal and interest be-
come due, and that such taxes will be levied with-
out limitation as to rate or amount." 
Sec. 12, p. 41, further provides: 
"The board will levy and collect in each fiscal 
year an ad valorem tax levied on all taxable prop-
erty in the district at such rate not greater than 
four ( 4) mills on the dollar as will be fully suffi-
cient, in conjunction with any surplus available 
from the preceding fiscal year under the provi-
sions of Section 11 (e) hereof * * * ." 
That the board of trustees of the district have the 
statutory authority to levy taxes cannot be denied. Sec. 
17-6-3.4, Chapter 29, Laws of Utah, 1953, provides: 
17 
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"* * the board of trustees of the district shall 
adopt and certify to the county clerk a resolution 
specifying the amount of taxes to be levied for 
such year on the property of the district, and it 
shall be the mandatory duty of the board of county 
commissioners * * to levy a tax * * at the rate 
specified in said resolution of the board of 
trustees." 
This Court in Tygesenv. Magna Water Co., 116 Utah 
...... , 226 Pac. 2d 127 recognized this as a direct power to 
levy taxes. At p. 132 of 226 Pac. 2d, this Court said: 
"The taxes which the Act empowers the Dis-
trict to levy for the payment of the benefits are 
general taxes and not special assessments." 
There has been no election in the district of the 
"corporate authorities" who levy these taxes. Nor is 
there any method or means or statutory authority where-
by the people can now call for an election. Sec. 17-6-3.1, 
Chapter 29, Laws of Utah 1953, para. 3, recites the only 
procedure provided for calling an election of officers: 
"Upon petition, signed by at least ten (10) 
per cent of the persons eligible to vote on a bond 
issue in any district created under this act, being 
filed with the Board of County Commissioners, 
thirty (30) days prior to the date set for the 
bond election, or ninety (90) days prior to the 
date set for succeeding elections, requesting that 
an election for trustees be held, the Board of 
County Commissioners shall be required to pro-
ceed with the election in the manner provided 
hereafter." 
Does the term "succeeding elections" mean succeed-
ing elections of officers or succeeding bond elections~ 
The bond election has been held and no date for succeed-
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ing elections of officers can be set until after the first 
election of officers. Sec. 17-6-3.1, further provides : 
"* * After the first election, elections for 
elective members of boards of trustees shall be 
held on the first Wednesday in December in each 
succeeding two years after the first election." 
The time for calling the first election of officers is 
past and the possibility of any future bond election being 
called by the trustees is remote. The taxpayers cannot 
petition for a bond election under the provisions of the 
Improvement District Act as amended by Chapter 29, 
Laws of Utah 1953. The Salt Lake County Commis-
sioners have appointed themselves the Board of Trustees 
of the Sewer District. See the Nov. 18, 1953 Bond resolu-
tion (Ex. E), Sec. 1, para.1, p. 9. 
In Tygesen v. Magna Wa.ter Co., Supra, this Court 
held that an Improvement District is a separate and 
distinct arm of the government. At p. 135 of 226 Pac. 2d, 
the court said : 
"Since a district is not a county but a sepa-
rate arm of the government distinct from counties 
or municipalities, the constitutional provisions as 
to counties do not apply." 
And further at p. 130: 
"The fact that proceedings to initiate an Im-
provement District is left to the county commis-
sioners of the counties in which the Districts can 
be formed might lend some support to an argu-
ment that a district would not be a separate and 
distinct arm of the government but merely be an 
arm of a county for the purpose of carrying out 
a county function, were it not for the fact that 
once the District is actually organized the county 
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has no further connection with the District except 
the ministerial one of levying any taxes certified 
to it by the Board of Trustees, a duty of the 
county which is similar to that performed by it 
for Boards of Education under the provisions of 
Sec. 75-12-10, U.C.A. 1943." 
Can the county commissioners create and appoint 
themselves the head of a "separate and distinct arm of 
the government" by resolution and without the vote of 
the people in that separate and distinct district and then 
proceed to certify and levy the taxes for such district~ 
Can the county commissioners by resolution administe~ 
and control a school district~ The "corporate authorities" 
must be qualified members of the corporation and must 
be elected to the office by the corporate members before 
they can assess and levy the general taxes of the corpo-
ration. 
The right to vote for the "corporate authorities" who 
have the power to levy taxes has not been at issue before 
the courts in the special district cases and is one of the 
vital issues in the instant case. This valid complaint 
should not have been "dismissed with prejudice, no cause 
of action" by the District Court. 
The issue of election of officers was not before this 
Court when the Improvement District Act was considered 
in Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., Supra. The statute 
which was under review in the Magna case provided for 
an election of three trustees at the bond election "each 
of whom shall be a taxpayer and a qualified voter in the 
district." Sec. 7, Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1949. 
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In prior cases before this Court involving special 
districts, the question of election of officers has not been 
adjudicated. It was not ruled upon in Patterick v. Car-
bon Water Conservancy DiJst., 106 Utah 55, 145, Pac. 2d 
503, nor in Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 Pac. 2d 
530, nor in Argyle v. Johnson, 39 Utah 500. 
In Argyle v. Johnson, Supra, the Drainage Act of 
1907 was reviewed by this Court. The point at issue was 
that the law permitted a taxpayer no hearing as to 
whether his property would be benefited and no method 
whereby his property could be excluded if so determined, 
that it would not be benefited. 
Title 20, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, under which 
the drainage district in the Argyle case was created, pro-
vided the following steps in its formation: (1) A petition 
signed by a majority of the property holders asking for 
the formation and defining the boundaries. (2) A hearing 
as to the boundaries and any lands not included could 
be included, but none could be excluded. (3) A secret 
ballot on the election to creat the district; a two thirds 
majority of the electors was necessary to carry the elec-
tion. And ( 4) A secret ballot for election of trustees of 
the district. 
It was the issue brought by provision (2) which was 
before the court in the Argyle case. This Court held as 
follows at p. 507 of 39 Utah: 
"The * * objection, which is the serious one 
in the case, is the one that the act in question per-
mits private property to be taken without due 
process of law. This contention rests upon the 
fact that in forming drainage districts the law 
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provides for no means by which a landowner may 
have a hearing and determination of the questions 
of whether his lands are subject to improvement, 
or can or will be improved by the system of drain-
age which is proposed by those who present the 
petition to the county commissioners." 
The Drainage District Act was subsequently 
amended in lieu of this adverse decision and the elective 
features of (3) and ( 4) above, which are fundamental 
rights of a free people, were not included in the revised 
law. Great emphasis and importance was placed upon 
the formal hearing while ignoring the more important 
and fundamental rights to management and control and 
taxation by "corporate authorities." See Sec. 2040-26, 
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917. 
The right of the people to exercise their franchise by 
the secret ballot for the officers of a governmental unit 
who are to levy the general taxes of that unit, and the 
election to create the special governmental unit is a 
fundamental principle of a free people. Art. IV No. 8 
of our Constitution provides that "All elections shall be 
by secret ballot." This fundamental right should not 
liave been so lightly dropped from the statutes by the 
legislature. 
The power to levy taxes cannot be delegated to other 
than the "corporate authorities." See Art. XIII #5, Const. 
of Utah, Supra. This constitutional provision will be dis-
cussed in two parts: (a) Definition of the term "corpo-
rate authorities," and (b) The corporate nature of the 
sewer district. Part (a) will be immediately argued; part 
(b) will be argued in Point 3 hereinafter. 
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This Court has had occasion to define the term 
"corporate authorities." In State v. Standford, 24 Utah 
148, 66 Pac. 1061. This Court said, at p. 159 of 24 Utah : 
"The terms of the Constitution are made 
mandatory and prohibitory, unless declared to be 
otherwise. Section 26 Article 1. By the term 
"corporate authorities" must be intended those 
municipal officers who are either directly elected 
by the population to be taxed or appointed in some 
mode to which they have given their assent. 
Hessler v. Commissioners, 53 Ill. 113." 
This Court in this same case referred to Harward v. 
St. Clair Drain Co., Supra, in which the Supreme Court 
of Ill. in discussing the status of Drainage Commissioners 
who had been appointed by legislative authority without 
a vote of the people in the district (which is on all fours 
with the instant sewer district case) and in ruling upon 
the constitutional article similar to our Article XIII #5, 
said at p. 135 of 51 Ill. : 
"We are of opinion that we do no violence to 
the language of the clause in the constitution we 
have been considering, by holding that it was 
designed to prevent such ill-advised legislation as 
the delegation of the taxing power to any person 
or persons other than the "corporate authorities" 
of the municipality or district to be taxed. These 
authorities are elected by the people to be taxed, 
or appointed in some mode to which the people 
have given their assent, and to them alone can this 
power be safely delegated." · 
The trustees have no authority to tax the property 
holders in the corporate limits of the sewer district. It 
is a fundamental principle of free government that local 
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affairs shall be managed and controlled by local authori-
ties and taxes levied by them. This Court had occasion 
to look into the fundamental principles of government 
involved in the instant case in State v. Eldredge, Supra. 
At p. 483 of 27 Utah, this Court said: 
"One of the distinctive features of our repub-
lican form of government is the system of local 
self-government, whereby local governmental af-
fairs are administered by local authorities, and 
not by agents of the general government." 
That the county commissioners are but the agents 
of the state government in the instant case is argued in 
Point 3, Post. The Constitution of Utah prohibits county 
commissioners from administering, controlling and levy-
ing taxes for corporate functions which are not uniformly 
administered throughout the county. The people of Bing-
ham, for instance, should not have the right to vote for 
the "corporate authorities" of a "separate and distinct 
arm of the government" in an area in which they have 
no interest such as the sewer district. This subject is 
further developed and argued in Point 3 hereinafter and 
authorities are cited. 
The county commissioners cannot levy taxes of the 
sewer district as county commissioners, and they are 
without authority to levy taxes as trustees of the sewer 
district because they have not been so elected by the 
people. Also, the people have never assented to the man-
ner of their appointment because they have had no oppor-
tunity to vote on the resolution to create the district. The 
Supreme Court of Illinois in the Harward case, at p. 
136 of 51 Ill., further said : 
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"The persons to be taxed have never given 
their assent to this act, and have had no voice in 
the selection of the members of this corporation. 
As the object of this constitutional clause was to 
prevent the legislature from granting the power 
of local taxation to persons over whom the popu-
lation to be taxed could exercise no control, it is 
evident that, by the phrase 'corporate authorities,' 
must be understood those municipal officers who 
are either directly elected by such population or 
appointed in some mode to which they have given 
their assent." 
The legislature has exceeded its authority in dele-
gating to county commissioners the power to create, oper-
ate and tax a "separate and distinct arm of the govern-
ment." See Point 3 Post. If the county commissioners 
can initiate and levy the taxes for a special district in 
the county, then the district must be an arm of the county. 
This Court has held that an improvement district is a 
"separate arm of the government distinct from counties. 
In the instant case the constitutional right of the 
taxpayer to vote for the "corporate authorities" is denied. 
The taxpayers in the district are to be taxed by officers 
who have no authority to so tax. This is taxation without 
representation; this is a principle our forefathers 
thought just cause for revolution. 
POINT 3. POLITICAL POWER OF THE STATE 
USURPS THE CORPORATE POWERS OF LOCAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS IN THAT: 
A. COUNTIES ARE PERMITTED TO PERFORM LOCAL 
CORPORATE FUNCTIONS WHICH ARE NOT UNIFORM 
THROUGHOUT THE CLASS - ARTICLE XI SECTION 4. 
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B. THE SEWER DISTRICT IS A MUNICIPAL CORPO-
RATION WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF ART. VI SEC. 26, ART. 
XI SEC. 5, ART. XIII SEC. 5 AND ART. XIV SEC. 4. 
This point will be argued in the following order: 
A. The Sewer District as a Corporation. 
B. Definition of a Public Corporation. 
(1) The body politic- The police power. 
(2) The body corporate - Tlie proprietary 
power. 
C. The Corporate Nature of Counties. 
D. The Sewer District as a Municipal Corporation. 
E. Limits of Legislative Control. 
A. The Sewer District as a Corporation. 
The corporate nature of the sewer district must be 
defined to determine if constitutional provisions apply. 
Sec. 17-6-3.4, Ch. 29, L. 53, provides : 
"The Board of trustees shall exercise all 
powers and duties in the operation of the prop-
erties of the district as are ordinarily exercised 
by the governing body of a politico! subdivision." 
What are the corporate powers of a political sub-
division~ Which subdivision~ Is the sewer district a 
·separate political arm of the government or is it a corpo-
rate arm or is it both~ If it is a corporation, is it a 
private or a public corporation~ If a public corporation 
is it a municipal corporation~ 
That the sewer district is a corporation cannot be 
denied. It has authority to acquire a complete sewer 
system, issue bonds, have made an official seal, employ 
agents and "The board shall have the right to sue and 
26 
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be sued, to enter into all contracts which it may consider 
desirable * *." Sec. 17-6-3.4, Ch. 29, L. 53. This Court 
had occasion to define with completeness a corporation 
in Utah State Building Commission, for Use and Benefit 
of Mounta,in States Supply Co. v. Great American Indem-
nity Co. et al., 105 Utah 11, 140 Pac. 2d 763. At p. 17 and 
18 of 105 Utah, this court said : 
"Neither the name an entity is given, nor the 
failure to properly characterize it by name, deter-
mines its status in the law. We must look to the 
nature of the entity, its powers and duties, to 
determine whether or not it is a corporation. Rees 
v. Olmsted, 6 Cir., 135 F·. 296, 297, 68 Corpus Juris 
67. * * * * A leading case cited by most later ones 
discussing this subject is that of Gross v. Ken-
tucky Board of Managers of World's Columbian 
Exposition, 105 Ky. 840, 49 S.W. 458, 43 L.R.A. 
703. The court held that the said Board of Mana-
gers, appointed by the Governor as an agency of 
the State, although not expressly called such, 
was a corporate entity which could be sued for 
breach of contract because it had the· power to 
contract. 
"A case closely resembling the instant one is 
that of Whipple v. Tuxworth, 81 Ark. 391, 99 
S.W. 86; in that case, the question was whether 
or not improvement districts created by statute 
were corporations. The court stated at page 90 
of 99 S.W.: 'Improvement districts in this state 
are organized by the city councils of cities and 
towns under a valid law. They are given a par-
ticular name, and endowed with perpetual succes-
sion until their object is accomplished, with power 
to make contracts, incur debts, issue bonds, collect 
assessments, to sue, and to compel the city council 
by mandamus to make assessments. * * * The 
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effect of the statue is to make them corporations, 
though they are not denominated as such.' Citing 
other case. 
"In the case of Hancock v. Louisville & Nash-
ville Railroad, 145 U.S. 409, 415, 12 S.Ct. 969, 36 
L.Ed. 755, the Supreme Court of the United States 
also referred to this problem and stated at page 
412 of 145 U.S., at page 971 of 12 S.Ct.: 'This 
prescribed portion of Shelby county was author-
ized to issue bonds and subscribe stock * * * if 
this entity has power to create a debt, it becomes 
subject to suit * * * it was, though not named, a 
corporate entity.' This was so, even though no 
express power to sue or be sued was given to it 
by statute." 
This Court, however, in Tygesen v. Magna Water 
Co., supra, when considering the provision of Article 
XI #5 which provides that "Corpus for Mun. purposes 
shall not be created," held that an improvement district 
was not a corporation. At p. 131 o~ 226 Pac. 2d, this 
Court said: 
"An improvement district created under 
Chap. 24, Laws of Utah 1949 is not a corporation 
but is a separate arm of the government formed 
for public purposes* *." 
However, a corporation is defined in the immediately 
preceding paragraph on p. 130: 
"Once the District is formed the Board of 
Trustees have full control and supervision of the 
property and the conduct of affairs of the Dis-
trict. The District must have its own seal and its 
Board of Trustees may sue and be sued." 
Mr. Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion stated 
at p. 139: 
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"An Improvement District is an entity under 
Chapter 24 with powers to cause taxes to be levied 
for the limited purposes of the district, power to 
sue and amendability to suit, to make contracts 
for the benefit of the district, to own and use an 
official seal and generally to "perform or cause 
to be performed all acts which in its (the 
trustees') opinion are necessary and desirable in 
the conduct of its affairs and in the operation of 
the properties of the district. * * Having all the 
attributes of a corporation * *, it must be con-
sidered as such." 
The sewer district then, is a corporation. That the 
sewer district is a private corporation in its makeup and 
management may be debatable, however, from the follow-
ing definition, it can be seen that the district is a public 
corporation. 
B. Definition of a Public Corporation. 
Vol. I McQuillin Municipal Corporations (1st Ed.) 
#106, p. 249 defines three kinds of corporations: (1) 
PUBLIC-composed of the political or civil and tlie 
municipal. This group includes counties, townships, 
school, road, reclamation, cities, towns, villages, boroughs, 
etc., which possess the power to levy taxes which power 
is a state political power. (2) TECHNICALLY PRI-
VATE but quasi-public in character. This group is 
privately owned and includes railway, canal, telegraph, 
telephone, water , light, gas-the so called public utility 
corporations which derive expenses and profits from 
earnings. These have important governmental powers 
such as eminent domain, but they do not have the power 
to levy taxes or make assessments on property. (3) 
STRICKLY PRIVATE to promote private interests. 
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The owners of the technically private and the strictly 
private corporations are various individuals who have 
voluntarily invested their money in the enterprise as 
represented by stock certificates of ownership. Each 
share usually represents one vote for the officers of the 
corporation and for its general policy. 
The certificate of ownership of the public corpora-
tion might be said to be the property tax rolls or some 
evidence of citizenship. Each owner has the right to call 
. upon the "police power of the state" for the protection of 
his life, liberty and property; and each one has the right 
to vote his "one share" as evidenced by his citizenship 
for the officers of the police power-the body politic. The 
public corporation is composed of two entirely different 
means or functions: (1) The political or civil-the purely 
governmental-the body politic and (2) The properietary 
-the body corporate. For the special assessments and 
debts of the proprietary-the body corporate-the "one 
share" can be voted only by "such qualified electors as 
shall have paid a property tax." Const. of Utah, Art. 
XIV #3. 
To understand the terms of the Constitution of Utah, 
one must first define the principles of freedom and 
liberty upon which our constitutional form of government 
is based. For what functions and under what conditions 
can the government legitimately use the money it col-
lects by force from the owners~ What is the purpose of 
government~ Is it to own and administer property for 
the people or is it to protect the people in their individual 
ownership~ What tendencies in the nature of men and 
governments as taught by history does the Constitution 
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aim to guard against? Can the political, lawmaking side 
of the State exercise its police power to force a corporate 
function upon a local territory without the consent of the 
people in that territory? W~at is a municipal corpora-
tion and what are its functions and what protectional 
guards does it provide for the people? These questions 
must be answered before an intelligent answer can be 
made as to what the terms of the Constitution mean. 
Article I No. 1, Constitution of Utah, says: 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable 
right to enjoy and defend their liberties; to ac-
quire, possess and protect property; * * * ." 
This court in construing the fundamental principle 
of the delegating of the taxing power in State v. El-
dredge, supra, at p. 483 of 27 Utah, said: 
"In construing the supreme law, the mean-
ing of the framers must be ascertained from the 
whole purview of the instrument, and, in constru-
ing a particular section, the court may refer to any 
other section or provision to ascertain what was 
the object, purpose, and intention of the Consti-
tution makers in adopting such section. In a case 
like this the court will also consider the system of 
government in vogue prior to and at the time of 
the framing of the Constitution, and the political 
history of the country, and, out of the different 
constructions possible, will adopt and apply that 
which is most in accord with the genius of our 
institutions, the most likely intended by the 
framers of the instrument. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. 
Inter-State Com., 162 U.S. 197, 218, 16 Sup. Ct. 
666, 40 L. Ed. 940." 
The public corporation, as stated above, has two 
separate characteristics which must be defined: the 
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police power and the proprietary power. 
(1) The body politic-The police power. 
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (6th edition), 
Chap.16,p.704,says: • 
"The police power of the State, in a compre-
hensive sense, embraces its whole system of in-
ternal regulation, by which the State seeks not 
only to preserve the public order and to prevent 
offenses against the State, but also to establish 
for the intercourse of citizens with citizens those 
rules of good manners and good neighborhood 
which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, 
and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoy-
ment of his own so far as is reasonably consistent 
with a like enjoyment of rights by others." 
The police power is a system of internal regulation, 
rules of good manners, or order for the conforming of 
behavior. It is the law-making and law-enforcing power. 
Upon what should these rules or laws be based~ F'or this 
answer it is necessary to recur to the fundamental prin-
ciples of free government. Article I No. 27, Const. of 
Utah, says: 
"F-requent recurrence to fundamental princi-
ples is essential to the security of individual rights 
and the perpetuity of free government." 
At the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, 
Vol. I, p. 362, a motion was made to strike this section 
from the proposed constitution. Mr. Wells, speaking 
against the motion said: 
"Mr. Chairman, the committee deems this to 
be a patriotic utterance, that frequent recurrence 
should be made to fundamental principles, be-
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cause the tendency of the times might be as it has 
been in the past, not to recur very often to funda-
mental principles. When the people are oppressed 
and do not get their rights, it may be necessary to 
recur to fundamental principles * * *." 
Mr. Wells anticipated conditions of today, for the 
time of which he spoke is surely now. Power is given 
the sewer district to tax and create debt without limit and 
to tax without representation. The political arm of the 
government is permitted to usurp the corp·orate powers of 
local self-government. 
The police power of the State-the body politic-
can only legitimately be used to protect basic human 
rights. Bastiats'-The Law, p. 6, says: 
"Life, faculties, production-in other words, 
individuality, liberty, property-this is man. And 
in spite of the cunning of artful political leaders, 
these three gifts from God precede all human 
legislation, and are superior to it. Life, liberty, 
and property do not exist because men have made 
laws. On the contrary, it was the fact that life, 
liberty, and property existed beforehand that 
caused men to make laws in the first place. 
"The law is the collective organization of the 
individual right to lawful defense. Each of us 
has a natural right-from God-to defend his 
person, his liberty, and his property. These are 
the three basic requirements of life * * *. 
"If every person has the right to defend-
even by force-his person, his liberty, and his 
property, then it follows that a group of men have 
the right to organize and support a common force 
to protect these rights constantly. Thus the prin-
ciple of collective right-its reason for existing, 
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its lawfulness-is based on individual right. And 
the common force that protects this collective right 
cannot logically have any other purpose or any 
other mission than that for which it acts as a sub-
stitute. Thus, since an individual cannot lawfully 
use force against the person, liberty, or property 
of another individual, then the common force-for 
the same reason-cannot lawfully be used to de-
stroy the person, liberty, or property of indi-
viduals or groups." 
Article I No. 2, Constitution of Utah, provides: 
"All political power is inherent in the peO-
ple; and all free governments are founded on 
their authority for their equal protection and 
benefit • * * ." 
The primary purpose of government, then, is to 
protect individual liberty; and the police force of the. 
government is the collective force to protect individual 
liberty. The police power of the state can be used for no 
other legitimate ends. The police power can legitimately 
be used to enforce rules of conduct, but when it is used 
to force people to invest their money and property in 
government planned corporate enterprises in which 
the people involved have no voice and no control, then the 
police power has become an instrument which violates 
human rights. Perversions of this nature by govern-
ments, stifle liberty and create the fertile foundation up-
on which despotism and tyranny is born and flourishes, 
and has caused the downfall of free governments. 
The county commissioners, acting in their capacity 
as agents of the state police power, can, to protect the 
public health, enforce laws, by fine and imprisonment, 
forbidding the dumping of sewage in or on the ground 
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In areas where public health is endangered; but the 
Constitution forbids them the power to furnish the cor-
porate means for disposal of sewage in local areas. These 
corporate functions are reserved for local self-govern-
ment of the people directly involved. 
When an unincorporated area becomes compactly 
settled, certain corporate functions must be performed 
by the people as a corporate entity. Certain of the police 
powers of the state are delegated to the local area under 
the general laws to force minority groups to join in the 
corporate endeavor-to permit taxation of property, etc. 
This use of the police power has a tendency toward des-
potism, and experience has shown that the tendency of 
men and governments is to let this force get out of hand 
until all property is administered by agents of govern-
ment. 
The Constitution places limits beyond which local 
governments are forbidden to go in furnishing corporate 
services, and one of the main functions of the state and 
its purely political agents such as counties, is to see that 
the constitutional provisions and the general laws pro-
tecting individuals rights are obeyed. It has been the 
lesson of history that the police power can be best held 
in check by keeping the State and its civil subdivisions 
such as counties, out of corporate business; and by keep-
ing as close to the people as possible the police power 
which is used for corporate enterprise. The result of 
this endeavor has accounted for the growth and develop-
ment of the laws of local self-government and the protec-
tive guards in constitutions surrounding municipal cor-
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porations of all kinds. In State v. Eldredge, supra, at p. 
483 of 27 Utah, this court said: 
"All our institutions were founded with a view 
to local self-government, and assume its continu-
ance as one of the undoubted rights of the people. 
Cooley, Const. Lim. 207. Looking into the Consti-
tutions of the several States and of the United 
States, it will readily be observed that the inten-
tion of the framers of those instruments was that 
the agencies by which power was to be exercised 
should be brought as close as possible to the sub-
jects upon which the power was to operate. When 
the care exercised and means adopted are taken 
into consideration, the conclusion seems irrestible 
that the design was to bring the agencies and sub-
jects into the closest possible proximity. The de·-
sign of juxtaposition of agencies and subjects is 
clearly discernible by an examination of our 
American constitutional law. It is, likewise, under 
the English system of government, from which, 
doubtless, our forefathers obtained the idea. In 
contradistinction to a purely monarchial form of 
government, where the power is concentrated in 
one supreme ruler, our American system of gov-
ernment is opposed to centralization ·of power. The 
idea which permeates our whole system is that 
local authority shall manage and control local af-
fairs. These are inalienable rights of the pe·ople, 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United 
States, and can not be taken away." 
The police power'-the political functions of our 
State are divided between the three main branches of the 
state: (1) The legislative-the law making body, (2) The 
Executive-the law enforcement, the tax assessor and col-
lector, the recorder, and (3) The judicial-the interpreter 
and guardian of the law. These functions are purely gov-
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ernmental, no property ownership by the public corpora-
tion is involved; and these governmental functions are 
centered in the State· as defined and limited by the Consti-
tution. These governmental powers are delegated by the 
state to local areas by general laws as required by valid 
statutory and constitutional provisions, and represent 
the body politic side of a public corporation. 
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.) p. 5, 
says: 
"The term constitutional government is ap-
plied only to those whose fundamental rules or 
maxims not only locate the sovereign power in 
individuals or bodies designated or chosen in some 
prescribed manner, but also define the limits of its 
exercise so as to protect individual rights, and 
shield them against the assumption of arbitrary 
power.'' 
The provisions of the Constitution of Utah limiting 
and defining this police power of the state are definite 
and specific. The legislature has exceeded its authority 
in creating and delegating to the Salt Lake City Suburban 
Sanitary District the power to tax without limit and with-
out representation, to usurp the functions of local self-
government and to create debt without limit. 
Before referring to the constitutional provisions vio-
lated, a better understanding of a public corporation 
should be had by defining the body corporate. 
2. The body corporate-The Proprietary Power. 
It is impossible to define the body corporate side of 
a public corporation without defining a municipal corpo-
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ration. Vol. I McQuillin Municipal Corporations (2nd 
Ed.) p. 997, says: 
"* * * The test of corporate character was 
its property capacity. * * * As a municipal cor-
poration has a dual capacity, being a body politic 
and corporate, it exercises two kinds of powers, 
namely, public and private." 
A corporation with but the purely governmental 
powers is the State-the police power. A corporation 
with the p~wer to own and manage property, but without 
the police power to tax or assess the general public as 
owners of the corporation, is a private corporation. A 
corporation with both the governmental and proprietary 
powers is a municipal corporation. 
It assists to an understanding of a public corporation 
to distinguish between public and quasi and municipal 
corporations. Vol. I Dillon Municipal Corporations (5th 
Ed.) No. 37, P. 67, says: 
"Uivil corporations are of different grades 
or classes, but in essence and nature they must 
all be regarded as public. The school district or 
the road district is usually invested by general 
enactments operating throughout the State with 
a corporate character, the better to perform with-
in and for the locality its special function, which 
is indicated by its name. It is but an instrumen-
tality of the State, and the State incorporates it 
that it may the more effectually discharge· its 
appointed duty. So with Counties. They are in-
voluntary political or civil divisions of the State, 
created by general laws to aid in the administra-
tion of government. * * * They are purely auxili-
aries of the State; * * *. Considered with respect 
to the limited number of their corporate powers, 
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the bodies above named rank low down in the scale 
or grade of corporate existence; and hence have 
been frequently termed quasi corporations. This 
designation distinguishes them on the one hand 
from private corporations proper, such as cities 
or towns acting under charters, or incorporating 
statutes, and which are invested with more powers 
and endowed with special functions relating to 
the particular or local interests of the municipal-
ity, and to this end are granted a larger measure 
of corporate life. 
"* * * Nearly all of the courts have drawn 
a marked line of distinction between municipal 
corporations and quasi corporations, in respect 
to their liability to persons injured by their ne-
glect of duty. * * * One reason given for the dis-
tinction is, that with respect to local or municipal 
powers proper (as distinguished from those con-
ferred upon the municipality as a mere agent of 
the state) the inhabitants are to be regarded as 
having been clothed with them at their request 
and for their peculiar and special advantage, and 
that as to such powers and the duties springing 
out of them, the corporation has a private char-
acter, and is liable, on the like principles and gen-
erally to the same extent, as a private corpora-
tion." 
This private side is the proprietary-the body cor-
porate. At #97, p. 153, Dillon continues: 
"The administration of justice, the preserva-
tion of the public peace, and the like, although 
confided to local agencies, are essentially matters 
of public concern; while the enforcement of muni-
cipal by-laws proper, the establishment of local 
gas works, of local water works, the construction 
of local sewers, and the like, are matters which 
ordinarily pertain to the municipality as distin-
guished from the State at large." 
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C. The Corporate Nature of Counties. 
A better understanding of a public corporation can 
be had by defining the corporate nature of counties. The 
United States Supreme Court in State of Ma.rylarnd v. 
B. & 0. R. R. Co., 3 How. 534, said: 
"Counties are nothing more than certain por-
tions of the territory into which the state is di-
vided for the more convenient exercise of the 
powers of government." 
In 20 Corpus Juris Secundus-Counties, p. 753, it 
says: 
"As stated in Corpus Juris, which has been 
quoted with approval, comprehensively consider-
ed, a county is an involuntary political or civil 
division of the state, created by statute to aid 
in the administration of government." Citing case: 
"One of the political subdivisions of the state, cre-
ated only for public purposes, to facilitate and 
promote the administraiton of state government." 
State v. Oviatt, 4 Ohio 481, Affirmed 8 Ohio C. 
Ct. N.S. 567. 
See 15 Corpus Juris 388 and cases cited therein. 20 
C.J.S.-Gounties, p. 757 and 758 continues: 
"In accordance with these rules, a county is 
distinguished from a city or town, as a municipal 
corporation; (Counties are involuntary subdivi-
sions of the state; cities and other municipalities 
are voluntary." Campe v. Cermak, 161 N.E. 761, 
Ill.) it is distinguished from a city, in that it is 
only governmental in character and does not pos-
sess the double governmental and private char-
acter possessed by a city. ('A county is distin-
guishable from a city, in that the latter is created 
by charter, is granted power to own and manage 
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private property and is invested with a particular 
franchise, whereas a county is created for the pur-
pose of state government and exercises certain 
political powers as one of the state·'s civil divi-
sions.' Nassau County v. Lincer, 3 NYS 2d 327, af-
firmed 4 NYS 2d 77, 254 App. Div. 746, af-
firmed 20 NE 2d 1018.) However, * * * some 
decisions hold a county a municipal corporation 
equally with a city or town." Note: 15 C.J., p. 
391, note 32 and cases cited therein. 
From a study of the above it is seen that to the ex-
tent a county exercises corporate functions (proprietary 
powers), it is so graded as a municipal corporation. In 
Utah the counties have been permitted to exercise pro-
prietary powers to a greater extent than in most juris-
dictions. To insure that these proprietary powers exer-
cised by counties would be kept within proper bound~ 
and that local self-government would not be usurped or 
interferred with by agents of the state police power, the 
Constitution makers made it mandatory that the system 
of government in the county should be uniformly ad-
ministered throughout the class. Article XI #4, provides : 
"The Legislature shall establish a system of 
County government, which shall be uniform 
throughout the State,** *." 
Vol. I McQuillin Mun. Corpns. (2d Ed.) #212, p. 621, 
says: 
"Many state constitutions provide, in sub-
stance, that the legislature shall establish but one 
system of county government which shall be as 
nearly uniform as practicable throughout the 
state. * * * The evident purpose* * *is to prevent 
legislative interference in matters which concern 
alone the inhabitants of a given community." 
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In State v. Eldredge, Supra, this court quoted this 
Article of the Constitution as an exmnple of the intention 
of the framers of the Constitution to provide "closer 
adherence to local government* * *. Here is indicated an 
intention to have local business transacted and local 
affairs Inanaged and controlled by local authorities." 
If this law were enforced and the counties were re-
quired to perform unifonnly throughout the county any 
corporate function they undertook, double taxation which 
is burdening the people in cities in Utah would be elimi-
nated. No longer would city taxpayers be forced to pay 
general county taxes which are used to pay for the 
gathering of garbage in unincorporated areas and then, 
have to pay city taxes to get their own garbage hauled. 
The county would be required to gather garbage county 
wide or desist entirely. Because double taxation results 
in cheaper corporate ·services for unincorporated areas, 
the people in compactly settled unincorporated areas 
avoid incorporation and ask for more and more corpor-
ate county services. This creates a fertile ground for a 
further breaking of the Constitution as in the instant 
sewer case. 
The corporate powers which involve property and 
its effects are reserved for the administration of local 
officers of each local self-governmental unit; for the 
people in each village and ha1nlet to own, manage and 
control the corporation they have voluntarily created and 
they alone are responsible for the burdens they have 
shouldered and they alone enjoy the benefits. The state 
can regulate but it has no authority and is prohibited 
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from creating "corporations for municipal purposes" 
but "by general laws shall provid.e for the incorporation." 
See Article XI #5, post. 
The legislature and the county can regulate the local 
corporations, but these state officers cannot appropriate 
the wherewithal to perform the corporate functions. ~ir. 
McQuillin in his Mun. Corpns. Vol. I (1st Ed.), in quoting 
Judge Cooley in a leading case, at #168 p. 386, says: 
"'It is a fundamental principle in this state, 
recognized and perpetuated by express provisions 
of the Constitution, that the people of every ham-
let, town, and city of the state are entitled to the 
benefits of local self-government. * * And when a 
local convenience or need is to be supplied in 
which the people of the state at large are not con-
cerned, the state can no more by process of taxa-
tion take from the individual citizens the money to 
purchase it than they could, if it had been pro-
cured, appropriate it to the state use.' People el 
rei. Park Commissioners v. Common Co'llncil of 
Detroit, 28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202." 
The county commissioners and the legislature can 
act only as an official arm of the state police power in 
local areas. They have no authority to force the sewer 
district upon the people involuntarily. The people have 
had no voice in its creation nor in the appointment of its 
officers. The political arm of the government has 
usurped this corporate right of the people to local self-
government-the right to manage and control their own 
affairs. 
D. The Sewer District as a Municipal Corporation. 
As a municipal corporation is defined as having a 
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"dual capacity, being a body politic and corporate" and 
exercising "two kinds of powers, namely, public and 
private," (McQuillin Ante), we must deterrnine if the 
sewer district possesses the properties of a municipal 
corporation. If the sewer district has the properties of 
a municipal corporation, then to protect the liberties of 
the people as intended by the framers of the Constitution 
and to shield the people from the assumption of arbitrary 
power by their government, the protective measures 
taken by the people in forming their basic law regarding 
municipal corporations must apply to the sewer district. 
If these protective measures do not apply, then the people 
are without a constitutional form of government and ar~ 
left totally at the mercy of a legislative assembly which 
is subject to the influence of lobbyists and special privi-
lege and "do-gooder" groups, and the great American 
Experiment of rule by constitutional law to guarantee 
individual liberty is ended. We may soon awaken to find 
we have followed the pattern of history to our doom. 
Safeguards are placed in constitutions to protect the 
people and to insure an orderly and sound progress. It 
is not progress when the initiative, the happiness and the 
welfare of an individual is taken away and he is made 
both slave and bankrupt. 
That the sewer district possesses the properties of a 
municipal corporation cannot be denied. It is a body 
politic and a body corporate. It is an entity created to 
serve a local, compactly settled area with a corporate 
function for which cities and towns are created. It is 
a local area incorporated to perform a special proprie-
tary function. It possesses the police powers of the state 
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in the operation of the properties "as are ordinarily 
exercised by the governing body of a political subdivi-
sion." Sec. 17-6-3.4, Ch. 29, L. 53, provides: 
"* * * the board of trustees shall exercise all 
powers and duties in the operation of the prop-
erties of the district as are ordinarily exercised 
by the governing body of a political subdivision 
* * adopt such regulations and by-laws * * as it 
may see fit * * * have made an official seal * * * 
have the right to sue and be sued, to enter into all 
contracts which it may consider desirable for the 
benefit of the district, and generally may do all 
things and perform or cause to be performed all 
acts which in its opinion are necessary or desirable 
in the conduct of its affairs and in the operation 
of the properties of the district. 
"* * * not less than fifteen (15) days prior 
to the date in each year on which the board of 
county commissioners * * is to meet for the pur-
pose of levying general county taxes, the board 
of trustees of the district shall adopt and certify 
to the county clerk a resolution specifying the 
amount of taxes to be levied for such year on the 
property of the district, and it shall be the manda-
tory duty of the board of county commissioners 
* * to levy a tax for district purposes on all tax-
able property in the district situated within such 
county at the rate specified in said resolution of 
the board of trustees. Such taxes shall be extended 
and collected in the manner provided by law for 
the collection of general county taxes and the pro-
ceeds thereof shall as collected be turned over to 
the treasurer of the district." 
F'rom the above it can be seen that the sewer district 
has the proprietary power to own and manage property 
and is a body corporate and has the police power of the 
state to levy taxes and is a body politic. 
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The sewer district, then, has the dual capacity, the 
characteristics, and the powers of a municipal corpora-
tion; therefore, it must be a municipal corporation. This 
Court has recognized this self-evident truth by holding 
a drainage district possessing these powers to be a 
municipal corporation. In Elkins v. Millard County 
Drwinage District #3, 77 Utah 303, 294 Pac. 307. At p. 
318 of 77 Utah, this Court said: 
"A drainage district is one form of municipal 
corporation." 
The legislature recognized this truth in writing the 
Drainage District Act. Sec. 760-20, Compiled Laws of 
Utah, 1907, provided : 
"The organization of the district shall then 
be complete, and said district shall thereafter con-
stitute a municipal corporation with power to sue 
and be 'Sued." 
And also in writing the Water Conservancy Act. 
Sec.l00-11-7, U.C.A.1943, provided: 
"* * The Court * * shall declare the district 
organized and give it a corporate name, * * and 
thereupon the district shall be a political sub-
division of the state of Utah and a body corporate 
with all the powers of a public or municipal 
corporation." 
In the face of this, however, this Court proceeds to 
conclude in Pattervck v. Carbon Water Conservancy Dis-
trict, Supra, that a water conservancy district is not a 
municipal corporation. At p. 71 of 106 Utah, (Please note 
that in quoting the above statute the words "municipal 
corporation" were erroneously changed to "municipal 
organization.") this Court said: 
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"The Metropolitan Water District Act is 
analogous in this respect to the Water Conser-
vancy Act. The Water Conservancy Act contem-
plates organization of districts for a public pur-
pose; that is, the control and conservation of 
water which will benefit the community as a whole. 
In this respect it is different from drainage and 
irrigation districts which contemplate that bene-
fits shall inure to particular lands. The Water 
Conservancy District, when organized, is a public 
agency. Sec. 100-11-7, U.C.A. 1943, provides that 
when it is organized it '* * * shall be a political 
subdivision of the state of Utah and a body corpo-
rate with all the powers of a public or municipal 
organization.' " 
Although this Court denies that the entities are 
municipal corporations, it does recognize the vital and 
important fact that a district organized for a purpose 
"which will benefit the community as a whole * * * is 
different from drainage and irrigation districts which 
contemplate that benefits shall inure to particular lands." 
The elective features of the Drainage District Act were 
dropped from that act by the legislature, and emphasis 
was placed upon the "due process clause" as a result of 
the decision in the case of Argyle v. Johnson, Supra. See 
Point 2, Ante. Yet, this hearing on whether one's prop-
erty shall be benefited on a project "which will benefit 
the community as a whole" is the only "voice" granted a 
taxpayer in the creation and management of the sewer 
district in the instant case. Sec. 17-6-3, Chapter 29, Laws 
of Utah, 1953, provides : 
"Any taxpayer within said district may on 
or before said date so fixed protest against the 
establishment of such district, in writing, * *. At 
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the place and on the date and hour specified for 
the hearing in the notice, * * the board of county 
commissioners shall give full consideration to all 
protests which may have been so filed and shall 
hear all persons desiring to be heard and shall 
thereafter adopt a resolution either creating the 
district or determining that it shall not be created. 
Any resolution so creating a district may contain 
such changes as may be considered by the board 
to be equitable and necessary, including changes 
in the boundaries thereof to assure that the dis-
trict shall contain no property which will not be 
benefited by the proposed improvements." 
Will a municipal sewer or municipal water system 
improve the value of property~ 
The section continues: 
"Any property owner who shall have filed a 
written protest, * * * may within thirty (30) days 
after the adoption of the resolution establishing 
such district, apply to the district court * * for a 
writ of review of the actions of the board of 
County Commissioners in so establishing such 
district, but only upon the ground that his prop-
erty will not be benefited by the proposed im-
provements or upon the ground that the proceed-
ings in establishing the district have not been in 
compliance with the provisions of this statute." 
Provisions similar to these are in the Drainage Dis-
trict Act and the Irrigation District Act because in those 
cases it is possible that there can be lands within district 
boundaries not susceptible to improvement. In the instant 
case, however, a function is to be performed "which will 
benefit the cominunity as a whole," and, therefore, this 
provision has no legal meaning. To take from the people 
the right to create and manage and control the corpora-
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tion, and take from them the right to vote for the "corpo-
rate authorities" and the right to the protections provided 
in the Constitution for the corporate members of "a pub-
lic agency or entity created for beneficial and necessary 
public purposes" of a local community, and leave to the 
people only the right to protest at a "mock" hearing and 
trial, and hold this as "due process of law," is a travesty 
upon justice ! 
Is not a city or town "a public agency or entity 
created for beneficial and necessary public purposes~" 
Are not all municipal corporations~ 
This Court in Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., Supra, 
at p. 131 of 226 Pac. 2d, said: 
"An improvement district * * is a separate 
arm of the government formed for public pur-
poses, * *." 
What public purposes~ Proprietary purposes~ 
Political purposes~ Is it a separate poJitical arm of the 
governmental police power~ Is it a county~ A town~ 
Does it have police powers like a city or town~ Does it 
perform a local function like a city or town~ 
This Court in Tygesen v. Magna, further said at p. 
132 of 226 Pac. 2d: 
"It should be kept in mind that this Act was 
enacted to provide for the creation of Improve-
ment Districts wherever desired in the State, and 
that these Districts, when formed, are quasi-_ 
municipalities, * * *. The governmental acts of 
quasi-municipalities are like those of true munici-
palities, and when a muncipality acts within the 
powers given it by statute, its acts are not subject 
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to review by courts * 
palities, Sec. 199." 
And further at p. 140: 
* * See 62 C.J.S. Munici-
"An Improvement District, for instance, is 
neither flesh, fish nor fowl. It is a partial city 
or town-a quasi-municipality-in that it is set 
up to attain limited benefits for the district to be 
served, which benefits are those which an incorpo-
rated city or town could, within their debt limi-
tations, accomplish. They are certainly part of 
the functions a city or town is eminently fitted to 
exercise and for which functions they are in part 
constituted. * * * 
"True, the same thing might be accomplished 
if the inhabitants of the community would, instead 
of causing an improvement district to be estab-
lished, incorporate as a city or town as the case 
might be. In that event, the territory encompass-
ing the city or town would by incorporation be 
taken out of the county. The Improvement Dis-
trict Act accomplished the same thing. * * ." 
In other words, an improvement district has the 
characteristics of a city or town, it has the powers of a 
city or town, and it was created to perform the functions 
of a city or town, but if it were defined a municipal cor-
poration like a city or town, it would be unconstitutional; 
therefore, in order that constitutional provisions can be 
circumvented we must bury our heads in the sand and 
define an improvement district as "neither flesh, fish nor 
fowl." Thus liberty and free government are destroyed. 
The Court, instead of guarding the Constitution, has 
"implemented the legislation" to tear it to pieces. Lenin, 
in prescribing for the downfall of free nations, advised 
"to first confuse the vocabulary." Only by the perversion 
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of the meaning of words can an improvement district be 
said not to be a municipal corporation like a city or town. 
Does the sewer district possess both police and pro-
prietary powers~ If it has this dual power and character, 
it is a municipal corporation. If it possesses the powers 
of a city or town but is not a municipal corporation like 
a city or town, then the constitutional protective guards 
placed around a city or town do not apply and the 
people are without a basic, protective law; and they can 
be taxed without limit and thrown into debt without limit 
and can be ruled by political agents of government who 
have not been elected by the people who are so taxed 
and so ruled; and free government as won by our fore-
fathers and defined by our Constitution and, until 
recently, by the Courts has been lost. The enemies of the 
American Way of life have won. 
The sewer district cannot be a separate political arm 
of the government because the political subdivisions are 
enumerated in the Constitution. Article XI #1, provides : 
"The several counties of the Territory of 
Utah, existing at the time of the adoption of this 
Constitution, are hereby recognized as legal sub-
divisions of this State, and the precincts, and 
school districts, now existing in said counties, as 
legal subdivisions thereof, and they shall so con-
tinue until changed by law in pursuance of this 
article." 
In those states where the constitution does not de-
fine the civil divisions, such as counties, the legislatures 
have authority to create "separate arms of the govern-
ment." Our Constitution framers saw fit to limit and 
define the civil divisions of this State and to take from 
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the legislature the power to create and change them. 
Some of the delegates to the constitutional convention 
complained that the legislature would have nothing left 
for it to do because the Constitution was providing for 
everything. The Constitution of Utah is one of the best 
in the United States and is a bulwark of protection for 
individual liberty and freedom. The right to local self-
government and the protection of basic rights associated 
therewith permeates the entire document. 
The sewer district which has both the governmental 
and proprietary powers is a municipal corporation, and 
it is as difficult to avoid admitting this truth as it is to 
ignore a mountain in our pathway around which a devi-
ous detour must be taken. That is why the Court ad-
mitted in the Tygesern v. Magna case that an improvement 
district is "a partial city or town." 
At the Constitutional convention a motion was made 
to strike the words "or other municipal corporation" 
from Article XIV #4. This section reads in part : 
"* * No county shall become indebted to an 
.amount * * exceeding two per centum. No city, 
town, school district or 'other municipal corpora-
tion shall become indebted, * * exceeding four per 
centum * * ." 
Mr. Thurman speaking against this motion at p. 
1135, Vol. II, Proceedings of the Constitutional Conven-
tion, said: 
"Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to striking out 
'.or other municipal corporation' and it ought not 
to have been struck out of the section that we 
struck it out of in the revenue act, because there 
52 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
may be municipal corporations not included in 
these names specified. For instance, a village is 
not included at all. Now, what harm does that 
do~ And it certainly saves any possible munici., 
pal corporation that exists now or that may here-
after be created." 
The term was later reinserted in Article XIII #5. 
What possible municipal corporations did the fram-
ers have in mind~ A village is defined in 20 C.J.S. 
Counties, p. 757: 
"A county is distinguished from a village in 
that a county is an involuntary subdivision of the 
state created .by the state for governmental pur-
poses, whereas a village is a voluntary corporation 
organized by the action of its own inhabitants for 
their own local benefit." Citing Nassau County 
v. Lincer, Supra. 
It was argued in the convention that the terms 
enumerated without specifying "or other municipal cor-
porations" covered all possible contingencies. At that 
time the term "town" was thought adequate to cove-r any 
and all municipal corporations, but the framers wanted 
to leave no possible loop-hole or misinterpretation of 
words or of intent whereby schemers could plot to usurp 
the corporate powers of local areas and take away the 
liberty of the people. 
As to what the term "town" meant, Vol. I McQuillin 
Municipal Corporations (1st Ed.) #108, p. 252, says: 
"The words, municipal corporations, have 
been held to include cities and villages and any 
other municipal corporation strictly so called. * * 
Towns are often called in common parlance, and 
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sometimes unguardedly in statutes, municipal cor-
porations in connection with counties, cities and 
villages; but ordinarily when so called it is in a 
sense of mere corporations, or quasi-corporations 
or of corporations sub-modo only. * * * The word 
* *town** is often commonly employed to desig-
nate places incorporated for local government 
under special acts, but not clothed with all the 
powers usually conferred on cities." 
This definition of a town would include an IInprove-
ment District as defined by this Court in Tygesen v. 
Magna Water Company, Supra. At the time our Consti-
tution was formed, a town was a quasi-municipality. Com-
piled Laws of Utah, 1888, Part II, Chapter XII, Section 
1819S1 through 1824S6, authorized "a majority of the 
taxpayers .of any town having a population of not less 
than 300 may incorporate." A board of five trustees (in-
cluding one President) were elected by the townspeople 
and then they were commissioned by the Governor. The 
powers of the town were very limited. They could regu-
late affairs which took but little money and could per-
form no corporate functions which required the inhabi-
tants to go into debt. They could have special deputies, 
regulate stray animals, dogs, travelling shows, build side-
walks, etc. They could not tax in any year an amount 
exceeding one fourth of one percent, unless voted by two 
thirds of the electors at a called special meeting, then not 
to exceed on half of one percent. If any municipal func-
tions were desired which required larger amounts of 
money, the community had to apply to the Territorial 
Legislature for a charter and become a full municipality; 
that is, a full municipality for the special functions for 
which they applied. Some areas wanted a water works, 
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some a sewer, etc., and the local areas were dotted with 
special charters. When the State was formed special 
charters were eliminated by the Constitution mandating 
that the areas would be governed by general laws. This 
will be argued in Section E Post. 
In Vol. I McQuillin Municipal Corporations (1st Ed.) 
#108, footnote, p. 264, it says: 
"* * What is embraced in the term municipal 
corporation largely depends upon the manner in 
which it is used and the proper construction to be 
given to it in the particular constitution or law 
where employed. * * Usually words as employed 
in public laws are received in their strict consti-
tutional sense unless the intention in the given 
case was to invest them with a more extended sig-
nification." 
And in #131, p. 304 : 
"The word 'town' is commonly used to include 
almost every character of municipal government 
from a city to a village or hamlet, embracing the 
whole range of bodies corporate, less than coun-
ties, established for local government." 
It was because the term "town" was thought to cover 
every contingency that the motion was made by the 
framers of the Constitution to strike the words "or other 
municipal corporations." The term was left in the con-
stitution to make absolutely certain that "any possible 
municipal corporation that exists now or that may here-
after be created" would be included. 
Article XIII #5, Constitution of Utah, provides: 
"The Legislature shall not impose taxes for 
the purpose of any county, city, town or other 
municipal corporation, * * *." 
55 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A county is a quasi-municipality and is enumerated 
along with a city; between these two grades of municipal 
corporations, lie all public corporations. As the word 
"town" and the term "other municipal corporation" is 
mentioned, every possible public corporation is included 
in this section of the Constitution. This proves without 
a question of a doubt, that the framers intended to pro-
tect the citizens in every particular from the assumption 
of arbitrary power by their government; that they in-
tended to include all voluntary and involuntary public 
corporations. 
By every definition, by the intention of the framers 
of the Constitution, by every legal and reasonable con-
clusion, and by the fundamental principles of free govern-
ment, the Sewer District is a municipal corporation with-
in the meaning of those sections of the Constitution of 
Utah where the terms "town" or "other municipal cor-
poration" are used. 
E. Limits of Legislatirve Control. 
This brings us to a consideration of whether the 
legislature has exceeded its authority in creating the Salt 
Lake City Suburban Sanitary District and delegating to 
it power to tax without limit and without representation, 
to perform a local corporate function, and to exceed debt 
limitations; and whether general laws which provide for 
incorporating compactly settled communities and their 
regulation have been ignored. The delegating of the 
police power to local areas to perform local corporate 
functions, upon the initiative and choice of the inhabi-
tants, is a fundamental principle of free government and, 
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to insure that adequate protective measures are taken to 
keep it voluntary and free, the Constitution mandates 
that the legislature provide for the incorporation of local 
areas by general laws and prohibits the state political 
power from creating such public corporations by legis-
lative fiat. 
The county and the legislature can exercise compul-
sory authority in state affairs only. They have no 
authority to force the sewer district upon the people in 
the district without the vote of the people in the district. 
The legislature has no authority to interfere in local 
corporate affairs. The authority of the state police power 
is limited to public afairs - the body politic side of a 
public corporation. Vol. I McQuillin Municipal Corpora-
tions (1st Ed.) #166, p. 383, says: 
"In matters of public concern, such as relate 
to the performance of functions by the municipal 
corporation as the agent of the state, the legis-
lature is not limited to conferring a discretionary 
power, but may exercise compulsory authority, 
where the local officers or agencies neglect or 
refuse to discharge their duty * * *. Touching 
duties which the people in the several localities 
owe to the state at large, it is manifest, they can-
not be allowed a discretionary authority to per-
form them or not as they may choose, for as 
tersely stated by Judge Cooley, 'Such an authority 
would be wholly inconsistent with anything like 
regular or uniform government in the state.' 
People ex rel. v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228." 
The state can regulate public affairs such as the time 
and manner of holding elections, the manner of uniformly 
assessing property, regulating the courts, protecting the 
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health as explained hereinbefore, etc., and if the munici-
pal corporation does not perform these state functions 
as prescribed by the general laws, the state, through its 
authorized agents, can exercise compulsory authority. 
The state, however, cannot use its police power to appro-
priate the corporate property nor the means to acquire 
it, this is reserved for local self-government. 
McQuillin at #168, p. 386, continues: 
"As we have seen, a municipal corporation is 
in part a public agency of the state, and in part 
it is possessed o.f local franchises and rights which 
pertain to it as a legal personality or entity for 
its quasi-private (as distinguished from public) 
corporate advantage. 
"The general doctrine as to the limitation of 
legislative control is clearly expressed by Judge 
Cooley in a leading case. He says: "The proposi-
tion which asserts the amplitude of legislative 
control over municipal corporations, when con-
fined, as it should be, to such corporations as 
agencies of the State in its government, is entirely 
sound. They have other objects and purposes 
peculiarly local, and in which the state at large, 
except in conferring the power and regulating its 
exercise, is legally no more concerned than it is in 
the individual and private concerns .of its several 
citizens* * *. It is a fundamental principle in this 
state, recognized and perpetuated by express pro-
visions of the Constitution, that the people of 
every hamlet, town, and city of the state are 
entitled to the benefits of local self-government. 
* * * The right of the State is a right of regulation, 
not of appropriation. * * * And when a local con-
venience or need is to be supplied in which the 
people of the state at large are not concerned, the 
state can no more by process of taxation take 
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from the individual citizens the money to purchase 
it than they could, if it had been procured, appro-
priate it to the state use. * * From the very dawn 
of our liberties the principle most unquestionable 
of all has been this : that the people shall vote the 
taxes they are to pay, or be permitted to choose 
representatives for the purpose.' People ex Rel. 
Park Commissioners v. Common Council of 
Detroit, 28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202." 
The state, the legislature and the county can regulate 
local corporate functions and define the extent and nature 
of such functions, but the police power cannot be used to 
create, manage and operate and levy taxes for these 
functions, without the vote of the people and their direct 
participation. 
The general rule of legislative power to create cor-
porations to aid in the administration of public affairs 
was stated by this Court in Lehi City v. Meiling, Supra. 
At p. 263 of 87 Utah, this Court said: 
"The general rule is that stated by Mr. Mc-
Quillin in 1 McQuillin Municipal Corporations 
(2 Ed.) 387: 'In the absence of constitutional limi-
tations the state legislature may create any kind 
of a corporation to aid in the administration of 
public affairs and endow such corporation and its 
officers with such powers and functions as it may 
deem necessary.'" 
The court then proceeds to turn its hack upon the 
Constitution, and not only ignore the fact that .lMr. 
McQuillin is referring to the purely governmental public 
corporation, but apply the reference to the proprietary 
powers. That Mr. McQuillin never so intended is plainly 
discernible by referring to the chapter from which the 
above reference was taken. 
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Mr. McQuillin even questions the right to unlimited 
control of the governmental side when not limited by 
constitutional provisions. Yol. I McQuillin :Municipal 
Corporations (2d Ed.) #188, pages 545 and 546, says: 
"It is difficult to accept in its entirety the 
doctrine of absolute unlimited legislative control, 
if the view should be adopted which is undoubtedly 
historically correct, that local self-government of 
the municipal corporation does not spring from, 
nor exist by virtue of, written constitutions, nor 
is it a mere privilege conferred by the central 
authority. The fact is, as repeatedly pointed out, 
that the people of the various organized communi-
ties exercise their rights of local self-government 
under the protection of these fundamental princi-
ples which were accepted, without doubt or ques-
tion, when the several constitutions were promul-
gated. 
"Therefore, it appears clear that in a govern-
ment in which the legislative power of state is not 
omnipotent, and in which it is axiomatic that local 
self-government is not a mere privilege, but a 
matter of absolute political right, the existence of 
unlimited authority in the state does not exist. 
Graham v. Fresno, 151 Cal. 465, 91 Pac. 147, 
Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343, State ex rei. v. 
Barker 89 N.W. 204 (Ia.), People ex rei. v. De-
troit, 29 Mich. 108, People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 
44, Helena Consolidated Water Co. v. Steel, 49 
Pac. 382 (Mont.) Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U.S. 
358." 
This fundamental principle was well expressed by 
this Court in State v. Eldredge, Supra, and in State v. 
Standfor'd, Supra. See quotes Ante. Not only is the doc-
trine of unlimited legislative control repugnant to the 
fundamental principles of a free government, but it is 
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expressly limited by the Utah State Constitution 1n 
several of its Articles as follows: 
( 1). The purely governmental divisions of the sta,te 
are fixed. 
Article XI #1, Supra, takes from the legislature the 
power to create counties. This section also takes from 
the legislature the authority to create or change the 
school districts and precincts. There was a concerted 
fight at the Constitutional Convention to leave the legis-
lature a free hand, but the framers saw fit to provide 
constitutional limitations on the legislative power. Gan 
the Sewer District be a separate political subdivision of 
the state like a county~ It is not like a county; it is like 
a town. 
(2). Local areas to be incorporated by genera.Z laws. 
Incorporation by special laws forbidden. 
Article VI #26 prohibits the legislature from incor-
porating local areas by special laws. Part ( 12) provides : 
"The Legislature is prohibited from enacting 
any private or special laws in the following cases: 
(12) Incorporating cities, towns or villages: * * ." 
Art. XI #5, mandates that local areas shall be in-
corporated by general laws: 
"Corporations for municipal purposes shall 
not be created by special laws. The Legislature 
by general laws shall provide for the incorpora-
tion, organization and classification of cities and 
towns in proportion to population, which laws may 
be altered, amended or repealed. * *." 
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The state is to provide for the incorporation. It is 
prohibited from moving into a local area and incorpo-
rating it by resolution of one of its governmental agents. 
In the widely quoted case of People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 
44, it was held that the act was confined to directing; 
"that in thus directing, their power is exhausted." 
A general law must have uniform operation through-
out the class. Any municipal corporation created must 
take the steps required in the general laws. The general 
laws of incorporation in the state leave entirely to the 
initiative of the people the voluntary creation of the city 
or town, and the steps taken in incorporating a city or 
town are uniformly administered throughout the state. 
This is a protection for the people. When a compactly 
settled area needs a municipal function like a sewer and 
the promoters desire to incorporate in a different way 
from the general laws which provide for the incorpora-
tion of compactly settled areas like cities or towns, the 
promoters of the particular areas apply to the legislature 
for special consideration or charter or franchise or call 
it what you will. In these cases the members of the legis-
lature who are not involved do not always exert the dili-
gence that is necessary to guard fundamental rights of 
the people. This idea was well expressed by Mr. Evans 
(Weber) at the Proceedings of the Constitutional Con-
vention, Y ol. I, Page 402: 
"* * * the Legislature is composed of people 
from all over the territory. They look after the 
interests of each particular section of the Terri-
tory, and if a few people were to go into the Legis-
lature desiring a certain charter for Salt Lake 
City, and the people outside of Salt Lake City not 
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being interested at all in it, would say, 'All right, 
you can have just such a charter as you want:' the 
charter given to Salt Lake may not be the charac-
ter of a charter that the people of Salt Lake want, 
although its representatives may be working for it. 
But when we make them all uniform and classify 
them, then there certainly can be no danger * * ." 
General laws must be uniform. If one area has a 
sewer all areas should have complied with the same pro-
cedural steps described in the general laws. If not, the 
law is not general and uniform. Chap. 29, Laws of Utah 
1953, is a special law because it permits the county com-
missioners to incorporate a local area "upon its own mo-
tion," and to appoint themselves the governing board of 
the corporation. This is contrary to the provisions of the 
general laws for incorporating local areas. The framers 
of the Constitution to make sure that the provisions of 
the Constitution would not be circumscribed provided 
in Art. I #24: "All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation." 
Vol. I Dillon Mun. Corpns. (5th Ed.) #143, p. 260, 
says: 
"In those states in which the Constitutions 
simply prohibit the enactment of local or special 
legislation upon specified subjects without any 
specific requirement that laws of a general nature 
shall have a unifor1n operation, it * * * is a simple 
prohibition of special legislation (and) is not a 
requirement that the laws shall he uniform or have 
a uniform operation." 
Judge Dillon continues that jurisdictions have pro-
ceeded to pass special legislation and it has been declared 
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valid. In #144 and #145, he says that where the Consti-
tution requires uniform operation, it is mandatory. 
A general law having uniform operation must op-
erate upon all throughout the class of the lawmaking 
body. The general laws of incorporation apply to the en-
tire State. Towns and cities are created to perform muni-
cipal functions. The sewer district was created to perform 
one of these functions. If one method leaves to the initia-
tive of the people in the area to be incorporated the exer-
cise of the secret ballot for officers and for the creation, 
and another method takes from the people these funda-
mental rights, can we still stay that the general laws pro-
vidin-g for the creation have been complied with and that 
they are uniformly administered~ 
The extent and nature of the functions a city or town 
is permitted to perform are defined in the general laws 
pertaining to the class. Cities and towns are classified 
after they are created and general laws applying to that 
class then apply. To what class does the special muni-
cipal function of providing a sewer apply~ Does it apply 
to a county~ To what class does the sewer district be·-
long~ The sewer district was created within arbitrarily 
drawn lines within the unincorporated area of a county 
by resolution of the County Commissioners. Can a law 
be made to apply to a part of the unincorporated area of 
a county and still be considered to apply to all of the 
class~ In Nichols v. Walter, 33 N.W. 800 (Minn.1887), 
the court said, p. 801 : 
"The authorities are agreed that a law 
general in its form, but special in its operation, 
violates a constitutional inhibition of special legis-
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lation as much as though special in form; and they 
are also agreed that, for the purpose of applying 
different rules to different subjects, the legisla-
ture cannot adopt a mere arbitrary classification. 
To permit that would open the door to a complete 
evasion of the Constitution. * * * In determining 
whether a law be general or special, courts will 
look, not to its form and phraseology merely, but 
to its substance and necessary operation. A law is 
general and uniform in its operation which oper-
ates equally upon all the subjects within the class 
of subjects for which the rule is adopted; but, 
as we have said, the legislature cannot adopt a 
mere arbitrary classification, even though the law 
be made to operate equally upon each subject of 
each of the classes adopted. State v. Hammer, 42 
N J Law 435." 
In Groves v. Grant Cournty, 26 S.E. 460 (W.Va.), at 
P. 463, the court said: 
"Special laws are those made for individual 
cases, or for less than a class requiring laws ap-
propriate to its peculiar condition and circum-
stances; local laws are special as to place. See 
Suth. St. Const. #127, citing State v. Wilcox, 45 
Mo. 458. A general law is that which relates to 
a whole class of persons, places, relations, or 
things grouped according to some specified class 
characteristic, binding all within the jurisdiction 
of the lawmaking power, limited as that power 
may be by its territorial operation or by constitu-
tional restraint. * * * A general or public act is 
a universal rule that regards the whole commun-
ity.' 1 Bl. Com. 86." 
Chapter 29, Laws of Utah, 1953 is a special law be-
cause it provides for the creation of a municipal corpora-
tion in a special way and it provides for a local corpo-
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rate function in only a part of the unincorporated area 
of a county class. 
(3) Creat.ion of corporations and the delegation of 
authority to corporat~ons to perform special m.unicipal 
functions forbidden. 
The legislature is prohibited from providing for the 
incorporation of any areas to perform any municipal 
functions except towns and cities. That a sewer project is 
a municipal function cannot be denied. It is a function 
that is needed in compactly settled communities only. 
A sewer is enumerated as a municipal function in Article 
XIV #4, Post, of the Constitution of Utah. It is one of 
the greatest and most important functions a city or town 
performs. 
In Vol. I McQuillin Municipal Corporations (2nd 
Ed.) #339, municipal functions are classified. The build-
ing of sewers, collection of garbage, furnishing of water, 
gas, electricity, railways, etc., are classified as municipal 
functions. 
This Court in Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., Supra, 
at p. 140, said: 
"An Improvement District * * * is a partial 
city or town * * * it is set up to attain limited bene-
fits for the district to be served. * * * They are 
certainly part of the functions a city or town is 
eminently fitted to exercise and for which func-
tions they are in part constituted." 
To say that a public corporation is not performing 
a municipal function in furnishing any of the above serv-
ices because it is not a city is a pure evasion and perver-
sion of the meaning of words. 
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Article XI #5, provides: "Corporations for muni-
cipal purposes shall not be created by special laws. * * ." 
That the Sewer District is a corporation created for 
municipal purposes cannot be denied. 
The general laws provide for the incorporation and 
define the extent and nature of the corporate functions, 
but they do not create the corporation to perform any 
one special function. The incorporators themselves, upon 
their own voluntary decisions, determine which and how 
many of the functions authorized by the general laws 
shall be performed; and the decision is independent of 
the political powers of the state. One town may desire to 
purchase electric power from a public utility; another 
may wish to own its own power plant. One city may want 
a sewer; another a water system, etc. Another may want 
to own and furnish all local services which are authorized 
and in addition may importune the legislature to enlarge 
and extend the general laws, or if failing in that, to obtain 
a special franchise in the guise of a general law as 
in the instant case. It is a common and fatal tendency 
of men and governments to extend and enlarge the cor-
porate functions of government until the state becomes 
a paternal agency to furnish those services which the 
people can better serve themselves through private enter-
prise. When the government furnishes all the corporate 
services for its people, socialism is complete. 
It was to eliminate special charters, whereby a com-
munity could perform a special function, that the framers 
of the Constitution intended by Article XI #5. At the 
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Vol. I, 
Mr. Evans (Weber), speaking against a motion to strike 
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from this section the words "Corporations for municipal 
purposes shall not be created by special laws, but," at p. 
402, said: 
".Mr. Chairman, I run in favor of the section 
as it stands. I know that if you strike that out, 
there will be frequent importunities upon the part 
of small villages to the Legislature to have special 
charters. I do not think we ought to do that. I do 
not think we ought to permit it." 
A comparison of this intent with the opinion of this 
court in Tygesen 1.:. Magna Water Co., Supra, indicates 
how far we have drifted from the intent of the framers, 
the provisions of the Constitution and the fundamental 
principles of free government. At p. 136 of 226 Pac. 2d, 
this Court said: 
"Of course, there is common to the constitu-
tions of all districts permitted by law the fact 
that they are districts-that is, that they are con-
fined to certain areas, and that the functioning of 
each is related to that area. That is why the word 
'district' always appears in their title". And com-
mon to the objective of forming districts is the 
principle of democratic cooperation by a majority 
in number of property value for the purposes to 
be subserved by the district. But the purposes of 
each may vary considerably and consequently the 
nature of the functions and the way they are con-
stituted correspondingly vary according to the 
purposes to be effectuated. Its governing body 
and the procedure by which it may be constituted 
will likewise be fashioned to effectuate those pur-
poses and functions. * * * Necessity being the 
mother of invention, Acts are prompted by the 
particular necessities of certain areas whereas an-
other area Inay require a more grandiose plan. 
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The outstanding purpose common to all these laws 
is to permit communities and individuals to do 
things together, to cooperate for their common 
benefit through organization established under 
law. It is simply an application of the pervasive 
principle of cooperation." 
This describes clearly the special charter cases the 
framers of the Constitution prohibited. Improvement dis-
tricts use the police power to provide a municipal func-
tion, and it was to control the misuse of this power and 
protect the people from the assumption of arbitrary 
power by their government that Article XI #5 and Article 
VI #26 were written. In fact, it is the reason for having 
a Constitution. In the instant sewer district case, the 
"pervasive principle of cooperation" is the "cooperation" 
asked for and used by embryonic tyrants. 
( 4). Right of the power to tax is limited. 
In Harward v. St. Clair Drain Co., Supra, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois at p. 135 of 51 Ill., said: 
"The power of taxation is, of all the powers 
of government, the one most liable to abuse, even 
when exercised by the direct representatives of the 
people, and if committed to persons who may exer-
cise it over others without reference to their con-
sent, the certainty of its abuse would be simply a 
question of time. No person or class of persons 
can be safely entrusted with irresponsible power 
over the property of others, and such a powers is 
essentially despotic in its nature, and violative of 
all just principles of government. It matters not 
that, as in the present instance, it is to be pro-
fessedly exercised for public uses, by expending 
for the public benefit the tax collected. If it be a 
tax * * * imposed by persons acting under no re-
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sponsibility of official position, and Clothed with 
no authority of any kind, by those whom they 
propose to tax, it is, to the extent of such tax, mis-
government of the same character which our fore-
fathers thought just cause of revolution." 
Article XIII #5, Constitution of Utah, provides: 
"The Legislature shall not impose taxes for 
the purpose of any county, city, town or other 
municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in 
the corporate authorities thereof, respectively, the 
power to assess and collect taxes for all purposes 
of such corporation." 
As to whom the "corporate authorities" are has been 
argued in Point 2 Ante. That the sewer district is a 
"municipal corporation" within the purview of this sec-
tion cannot be denied and is argued in Part C. Only by 
ignoring plain and simple words in the Constitution can 
the court conclude as it did in Tygesen v. Magna Water 
Co., Supra. At p. 133 of 226 Pac. 2d, this court said: 
"See Patterick v. Water Conservancy Dist., 
supra, wherein this court pointed out that a dis-
trict could have been created by legislative fiat 
had the legislature so desired, since the creation 
of a district does not affect property rights, and 
since the legislature could have created the district 
by its own fiat it could have provided for a tax 
on all property within the district to pay for the 
costs and maintenance of the project * *." 
Art. VI #26, part (8) prohibits the legislature from 
"assessing and collecting taxes." 
This philosophy of government that legislatures are 
supreme as expressed in the :Magna ease is a popular 
trend in the thinking of people today. Whether it has 
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been taught in the schools or whether it is a fad acquired 
by a lethal lapse in thinking, matters not; it is entirely 
foreign to the American Way of Life and a constitution-
ally free people. If the legislative acts are the supreine 
law of the land, then the Constitution is subordinate 
thereto, and men have succeeded in putting themselves 
above that sacred law. Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) 
p. 431, says: 
"It is entirely correct, also, in assuming that a 
legislative enactment is not necessarily the law of 
the land. 'The words "by the law ·of the land" as 
used in the Constitution, do not mean a statute 
passed for the purpose of working the wrong. 
That construction would render the restriction 
absolutely nugatory, and turn this part of the 
Constitution into mere nonsense. The people would 
be made to say to the two houses; "You shall be 
vested with the legislative power of the State, 
but no one shall be disfranchised or deprived of 
any of the rights or privileges of a citizen, unless 
you pass a statute for that purpose. In other 
words, you shall not do the wrong unless you 
choose to do it."' Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140." 
Taxation without limit and without representation 
is permitted in the sewer district. See Point 2 Ante. 
( 5) Debt limitations are provided. 
Art. XIV #4 specifically recognizes a sewer as a 
municipal function and provides a debt limit for that im-
portant and expensive corporate function in compactly 
settled communities. That the sewer district is a muni-
cipal corporation within the purview of this section of 
the Constitution has been argued hereinbefore. The 
framers of the Constitution were "debt conscious" and 
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they placed limitations upon the new State and all subdi-
visions thereof in every particular. They meant to pro-
tect the people and especially future generations from ex-
cessive governmental expenditures and the resulting debt 
burdens and ruinous taxation that goes therewith. Mr. 
Varian, speaking on this subject, at p. 1000, Vol. I, said: 
"Are you willing to reach down into the fu-
ture and pilfer from the pockets of posterity, the 
thrift and industry of that generation? Are you 
willing to lay a lien upon the property of those 
who are to come after you? I say you have no 
right to do it* * *. It is better, Mr. President that 
the people make haste slowly. It is better that 
they grow not with a too rapid growth. There 
are evils attendant upon this sort of financial 
mislegislation that cannot be calculated * *." 
A sewer in the present district could be built in units 
with small treatment plants strategically located. At a 
later date when required and it is economically feasible, 
the proposed colossal treatment plant and the enormous 
trunk lines could be added. It has been argued that we 
must build for the future. This writer agrees but we 
should not overbuild. It has been argued that if any part 
needs replacement later, then we are wasting labor and 
materials. Did the pioneers waste their labor and ma-
terials building log cabins ? Did someone blunder be-
cause an old, inadequate office building must be torn 
down to make way for a larger one? If this is so, the 
present Continental National Bank Building should have 
been built by the first one who built a business establish-
ment on that corner. Have the economic laws been 
abridged? If we exceed constitutional debt limits we 
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are overbuilding. The framers of the Constitution recog-
nized that it is more economically sound and feasible to 
"grow not with a too rapid growth." 
It has been a lesson learned from bitter experience 
that the power to levy taxes and create debt upon prop-
erty is liable to serious abuse unless held in check and 
controlled. Vol. I Dillon Mun. Corpns. (5th Ed.) #190, 
p. 336, says: 
"The power to create debt including the 
power to issue negotiable long time bonds, and 
the power to levy taxes and assessments are the 
powers which experience has shown to be 
especially liable to serious abuse * *. The prone-
ness to incur indebtedness, especially if its bur-
den can be thrown upon posterity, is well known, 
and needs, in the interest of the public welfare, to 
be regulated and restricted." 
Majorities will usually vote for the schemes of pro-
moters who promise to provide the necessities of life 
on silver platters at bargain prices with deferred pay-
ments. In recounting the experience of Ogden voting to 
borrow money from the United States Government, Mr. 
Evans (Weber), at p. 1140 of the Proceedings, said : 
"Why, Ogden had no difficulty in voting for 
eight per cent at the time we wanted to borrow 
this money. They were unanimous in favor of it 
under the circumstances. And that is just the 
craze that reaches men's minds. It has reached 
mine. I understand it. I profit by the experience, 
and I would put a limitation in the Constitution 
prohibiting people going crazy under those cir-
cumstances. * * There would be such a limitation 
that though one citizen remained sane, he could 
go into the courts and say, "you cannot exceed 
this constitutional limit * * ." 
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A majority of the people in the sewer district voted 
for a bond :dsue which exceeds Constitutional limits. 
They did not realize that the revenue issue was a general 
obligation upon property the same as taxes; however, 
they did vote for an enormous and unreasonable debt. 
This craze of the people to go into debt was known and 
the framers of the Constitution made provisions to pro-
tect the minorities when majorities in local areas stop 
thinking and accept blindly the schemes of promoters 
which take away the basic liberties of the people. Schemes 
are planned to circumvent constituti('nal limits because 
it is difficult to raise debt limits in constitutions by 
amendment. The majority of the people in the state 
tend to protect the minorities in local areas. This is also 
the fundamental principle underlying the general law 
and uniform operation requirements. 
In affirming a decision of the Iowa Supreme Court, 
wherein a majority of the voters of Council Bluffs had 
voted to create a debt and the constitutional debt limit 
was being considered, the U. S. Circuit Ct., in Nash v. 
Council Bluffs, 174 F'ed.182, at p.184, said: 
"It is idle to talk about what majority some 
scheme has received. This provision of the Con-
stitution was adopted for the sole purpose of 
thwarting majorities, and giving protection to a 
minority. * * * The craze to go in debt, with the 
stock argmnent for the future generation to help 
pay the debts, as if they will not have enough of 
their own creation, is and has been ever present. 
Seldom is any scheme to be followed by a debt 
for any purpose voted down. The convention of 
1857 knew this. Counties and cities in Eastern 
Iowa had then gone In debt in extravagently 
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large amounts for different things, for the sup-
posed public good. Those schemes were supported 
by the same zeal and enthusiasm as are the 
schemes of paternalism of the present day. * * 
Debts created by Eastern Iowa Counties and 
Cities, before the adoption of the constitution 
more than fifty years ago, are still being paid 
by the future generations-the present taxpayers 
* *. These were the evils that the constitution was 
to strike down. * * ." 
F'rom the foregoing argument of Section E, it can 
be seen that the legislature and the state political power 
is limited and circumscribed in several particulars in 
the State of Utah. The framers of the Constitution 
emphasized that they meant no exceptions by writing 
Art. I #26 which states: 
"The provisions of this Constitution are man-
datory and prohibitory, unless by express words 
they are declared to be othe-rwise." 
Because schemers have employed devious methods 
whereby constitutional prohibitons are circumvented and 
because all of these schemes by their nature tend to a 
move away from decentralization of power toward cen-
tralization of power, it has become the popular trend to 
transfer more and 1nore of the purely local corporate 
functions to state created organizations. This tendency 
has been ever present in free governments and has been 
the ultimate cause of the downfall of free governments. 
Mr. McQuillin in his Vol. 1 Municipal Corpns. (2d Ed.) 
#185, p. 534, in commenting on the trend of legislatures 
to transfer to the State much of the purely local matters 
which are reserved for local self-government, said: 
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"It is obvious that a question of this charac-
ter, as remarked by Judge Cooley, who has given 
this subject profound study, is of the highest 
practical interest and concern, 'which cannot be 
answered without a careful scrutiny of the struc-
ture of our government and an exmnination of the 
principles which underlie free institutions in 
America.' He characterized such legislation 'as 
a blow aimed at the foundation of our structure 
of liberty,' and that when the state thus 'reaches 
out and draws to itself and appropriates the 
powers which from time immemorial have been 
locally possessed and exercised, and introduces 
into its legislation the centralizing ideas of Con-
tinental Europe, under which despotism, whether 
of monarch or commune, alone has flourished, we 
seemed forced back upon and compelled to take 
up and defend the plainest and most primary 
axioms of free government.' People v. Hurlbut, 
24 Mich. 44, People v. Morris, 13 Wend. (NY) 
325." 
In the instant case, agents of the State political 
power have appointed themselves the corporate officers 
of the district. The trustees are granted the authority 
to tax without limit. The people of the corporation are 
' denied the right of Article IV Section 8 to an election 
by the secret ballot for the officers. Taxation without 
representation is permitted. The corporate rights of 
local self-government are usurped by a political arm of 
the State government. Constitutional debt limits are 
ignored and greatly exceeded. The people in the district 
are reduced to mere puppets to do the will and bidding 
of political agents of the State. 
If this sort of despotism is permitted by the courts, 
then the Constitution has been emasculated and torn to 
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shreds and no longer exists. Individual, constitutional 
rights are in grave jeopardy and should be declared. If 
these rights are circumvented and ignored, then the Con-
stitution is dead and individual man is again reduced 
to the status of a slave by his government. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has gone to considerable lengths to con-
vince the Court that the special district laws have de-
parted from the fundamental principles of free govern-
ment to an extent that threaten and place in jeopardy 
the whole foundation of free government. Appellant sub-
mits that these vital issues have not been before the Court 
in the special district cases, or, if so, have been only in 
"friendly" suits and have not been adequately or prop-
erly controverted. 
This Court was "split" in the Lehi City v. Me~ling 
case when a devious, unconstitutional course was agreed 
upon. The deciding vote was cast by Mr. Justice Wolfe 
in his supplementing opinion which is pure dicta. Mr. 
Justice Moffat in the dissenting opinion, at p. 286 of 87 
Utah, said: 
"The mere asking of a writ of mandate re-
quiring a Ininisterial officer to perform an ordi-
nary duty incident to his office pursuant to the 
action of the governing board of a city is one 
thing. The dropping into the lap of the court a 
complex and complicated statute of over a half 
hundred sections and without definite issues or 
expressed or intended applications of the princi-
ples of law involved or any stated facts, circum-
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stances, or conditions to which the law is pro-
posed to be applied, and ask the court to pa:ss 
upon the validity of the whole legal, and antici-
pated factual and contractual possible set-ups 
that may grow out of the situation, is quite an-
other, and is not quite fair to the court and may 
result in embrassment * * when a crucial situa-
tion arises out of the complications which are 
sure to arise and later present themselves. No 
attempt is made to present or limit issues. The 
declaratory judgments act is not involved." 
Action in the Tygeson v. Magna Water Co. case upon 
which legal opinion respondents have leaned heavily, 
was brought by a plaintiff who said in his Brief at pages 
17-19, Vol. 611, Briefs, #7550: 
"Magna has a sewer system and disposal 
plant, garbage collection, street lights, street 
maintenance, fire and police protection * * a 
county recreation program all furnished by Salt 
Lake County. * * In fact, Magna has practically 
all services furnished under city government ex-
cept self rule. * * Plaintiff agrees that the need 
for improved water is urgent, and the program 
of the defendants is commendable. * * It is Plain-
tiff's position that the present trend is away from 
incorporating into cites and towns, and vesting 
more and more power in county governments, 
commissioners, and boards, to furnish needed 
facilities to unincorporated areas. Plaintiff con-
ceedes that the very purpose of the law now being 
considered in this proceedings was to permit 
unincorporated areas of the state to obtain ade-
quate water and sewer facilities for their com-
munities without being required to incorporate. 
Plaintiff makes no arguments against the advisa-
bility of such a trend." 
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In the instant case the whole argument is to save 
local self-government; to save to the individual the rights 
to the protections placed in the constitution around 
incorporated towns and villages; to stop unincorporated, 
compactly settled communities from capitaliizng upon the 
unconstitutional procedure of "double taxation" of the 
tax burdened incorporated cities and towns. If the con-
dition continues which the plaintiff in the Magna case 
eulogizes, then the constitutions and the magna chartas 
mean no more than the public documents in the lands of 
the dictators. 
At pages 20-21, the plaintiff continues: 
"Plaintiff is his own attorney in this matter, 
not so much from a matter of choice, as expedi-
ency. He feels that the court shold know that as 
a resident of the community of Magna and as an 
attorney, he has for years worked with civic 
groups and other attorneys on legislation that 
would permit the community of Magna to own its 
own water system without incorporation. In this 
connection Plaintiff has actively participated in 
preparing this law and the law it replaced and 
lobbied for the passage of both laws. After this 
law was passed, plaintiff actively participated in 
the necessary steps leading up to the creation of 
the defendant Water Company and the bond elec-
tion. In fact, Plaintiff anticipates a substantial 
legal fee for services rendered, conditioned on this 
court holding this law constitutional. 
"* * Plaintiff can only agree that the trend 
of the courts and the legislature toward vesting 
more and more authority in these 'quasi-munici-
pal corporations' is salutory." 
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The controversy was so "thin" in the Magna case 
that even this Court, at p. 141 of 226 Pac. 2d, complained: 
"What we really are asked to do in these cases 
involving bond issues is to give a declaratory 
judgment a:s to validity and constitutionality. The 
issues should be, if possible, truly adversarial and 
not a friendly proceeding on fictitious or arti-
ficially made issues." 
Should a question involving important public rights, 
extending through all cOining time, be conclusively de-
cided on such fictitious and artifically made issues and 
brought by a plaintiff with a viewpoint which could only 
lead to no argument~ Should a decision so obtained rate 
"stare decisis~" Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) Ch. 4, 
p. 62, says: 
"A party is concluded by a judgment against 
him from disputing its correctnes'S, so far as the 
point directly involved in the case was concerned 
* * but if strangers who have no interest in the 
subject matter are in like manner concluded * * 
we shall be met by the query, whether we are not 
concluding parties by decisions which others have 
obtained in fictitious controversies and by collu-
sion, or have suffered to pass without sufficient 
consideration and discussion, and which might 
perhaps have been given otherwise had other par-
ties had an opportunity of being heard." 
And further at p. 66 : 
"It will of course sometimes happen that a 
court will find a former decision so unfounded in 
law, so unreasonable in its deductions or so mis-
chievous in its consequences, as to feel compelled 
to disregard it. Footnote: 'We are by no means 
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unmindful of the salutary doctrine of the rule 
''stare decisis," but at the saine time we cannot 
be unmindful of the lessons furnished by our own 
consciousness, as well as hy judicial history, of 
the liability to error and the advantages of re-
vie\\·.' Per Smitli, J. in Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 
G03; And see l~neeland v. l\1 ilwaukee, 15 Wis. -1-G-1-; 
Taylor v. French, H) Yt. -!9; Bellows v. Parsons, 
13 N.I-I. ~5(); Hannel v. Smith, 1:) Ohio 134; Day 
v. ~Lunson, 1-l: Ohio St. 488; Harrow v. Myers, :29 
Ind. 4G9 ~ Paul v. Davis 100 Ind. -1-2~; Linn v. 
~Linor, -! ~ ev. -1-():2 ~ \Villis v. Owens, -t:~ Texas, 
-±1; * *." 
Appellant submits that an Improvement District 
which is organi~ed to furnish a eorporate function for a 
compactly settled counnunit~· which is a benefit to the 
entire community and not to certain lands only, and is 
a function for which eities and towns are created to pro-
vide, is a municipal corporation within the purview of the 
Constitution. --:\ppellant submits that the contrary hold-
ing in the ~[agna ease was in error and asks the Court 
to re-examine the· law; that a function is performed in 
a local community which ean only legally be performed 
by a cit~· or town incorporated under the general laws. 
Appellant submits that the revenue bond program of the 
sewer district is outside the special fund doctrine and 
creates a debt. 
Appellants asks this Court to declare his constitu-
tional right to vote for th<> "corporate authorities" of a 
public corporation who have the power to tax and assess 
appellant's property. ApJwllant asks this Court to de-
clare· his right to constitutional protection from unlimited 
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and excessive and ruinous tax and debt burdens. These 
basic and vital rights are now in grave jeopard.'·· The 
special district laws have been extended to the point 
where the entire Constitution and free governn1ent are 
in jeopardy. The basic issue in the instant case is not 
whether we shall or shall not have a sewer in an unincor-
porated area in Salt Lake County but rather whether 
. ' 
we shall have a constitutional government ruled by that 
law or a despotic government ruled by regulations, reso-
lutions and fancies of men. 
Our forefathers thought these violations of the basic 
rights of local self-government were just for revolution. 
1\ ppellant's valid cmnplaint should not have been dis-
rnissed by the district court as "No cause of action." If 
our free constitutional governn1ent is to continue, a stand 
rnust be made to save it. A flood of Improvement Dis-
tr·icts are awaiting the decision of this court. Is it not 
better to make our stand before we are engulfed in this 
new flood of despotisrn? When constitutional bars are 
let down the political pressure increases daily with the 
growing pregnancy for larger and larger governmental 
corporate endeavors. When the basic political law is cir-
cumyented and ignored, respect is soon lost for all laws. 
Can a stronger stand be rnade if the nwral fiber of the 
people has been further weakened"? Other free nations 
failed to rnake the stand until it was too late. Are we 
going to repeat the rnistakes of history? 
Appellants asks this court to stand rn the dignity 
of their duty as guards at the· house which holds the Con-
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stitutional Treasure, and desist from implementing the 
legislative efforts of embryonic tyrants in finding attic 
and basement by-laws to despoil that Treasure. "God 
give us men" with the wisdom and the· courage to stand 
against the political pressures of the hlind leaders of the 
blind. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE B. FREEMAN, 
2024 Lincoln Lane. 
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